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Another lawyer . . . who deals with a lawyer should not need to exercise 
the same degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly antique 




Imagine what it would be like to live in a world of truly honest lawyers. 
The lawyers in such a world would represent their clients zealously and strive 
as mightily as lawyers anywhere to advance their clients‘ legitimate interests. 
But, as truly honest lawyers, they would never deliberately distort the truth or 
withhold information in an effort to mislead others, nor would they take 
advantage of others‘ obvious mistakes. They would never try to persuade others 
to believe things that neither they nor their clients believe. On the contrary, the 
lawyers in such a world would take pains to ensure that the people they deal 
with never have reason to feel deceived, deluded, or betrayed. When in court, 
these truly honest lawyers would, at the very least, follow the ethical 
requirement to take ―reasonable remedial measures‖ to prevent fraudulent or 
criminal conduct related to the proceeding.
2
 More than that, however, they 
would never ―bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue,‖ 
unless they truly believe (or, at least, they believe that their clients believe) that 
there is a basis not merely on the admissible evidence but also in actual fact.
3
 In 
both transactions and in litigation these truly honest lawyers not only would 
never engage in conduct involving misrepresentation or other deceit
4
 but, in 
                                                                                                                 
  Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Miami University; J.D., Ohio 
State University. 
 1. Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 
589 (1975). 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009). 
 3. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009). The current Model Rules state 
that lawyers must have a basis in ―fact‖ for proceeding, id., but it appears this rule is properly 
understood to mean ―admissible evidence‖ rather than actual ―fact.‖ For example, a lawyer is 
free to assert a privilege or other evidentiary rule in an effort to obtain victory even though the 
lawyer knows that the client almost certainly would not prevail on the substance of the law if the 
tribunal were apprised of all the relevant facts. Stated differently, a lawyer is not ethically 
prohibited from using evidentiary or procedural rules to keep out evidence just because the 
lawyer knows that, deprived of the evidence in question, the tribunal will almost certainly reach 
a counterfactual conclusion on a critical point. If it looks reasonably possible that a case or issue 
can be won on a procedural or evidentiary point, then Rule 3.1 does not prevent the lawyer from 
trying to do so just because the lawyer knows that the client‘s basic claim or defense is, in point 
of actual fact, without substantive merit. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 
(2009); see also infra text accompanying notes 121–181.  
 4. Both are currently banned, nominally at least, under Model Rule 8.4(c). MODEL RULES 
OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009). However, although the Model Rules language prohibiting 
―misrepresentation‖ and ―deceit‖ appears very broad, there seems to be a considerable sentiment 
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addition, they would never purposely fail to disclose facts necessary to correct 
misapprehensions known to have arisen in the matter.
5
 They would never seek, 
by selective nondisclosures, objections to evidence, or the like, to lead the law 
astray.  
Our own world is, of course, not such a world. The ABA‘s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct contain a number of prescriptions for honest dealing,
6
 but 
relatively few people outside the legal profession consider the honesty and 
ethical standards of lawyers to be very high.
7
 This is not because most lawyers 
are habitual liars, for it is probably true that they are not.
8
 Rather the distrust of 
lawyers almost certainly has more to do with the deliberate efforts of lawyers to 
play the societal role that they think they must—a role that they see as intrinsic 
to the adversary system. It is a role in which keeping secrets can be more 
important than revealing truth,
9
 loyalty to client-defined objectives is elevated 
over commitment to justice,
10
 the advocate‘s proper function is seen to be 
                                                                                                                 
against applying these ―catch-all‖ prohibitions unless the lawyer‘s conduct also falls within a 
specific lawyer-code provision that states the elements of an offense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c (2000). 
 5. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009). Actually, the high standard of 
candor contained in this rule applies only to lawyer disciplinary matters and applications for 
admission to the bar, and its force is substantially undermined by an exception for information 
relating to the representation of a client—which is likely to include just about everything 
material that the lawyer is likely to know. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 1.2(d), 1.16(b)(3), 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.1(b), 
8.4 (2009). 
 7. Gallup polls on honesty and ethics show that Americans place lawyers among the 
lowest rated professions. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Nurses Top List in Honesty and Ethics 
Poll, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/Nurses-Top-List-
Honesty-Ethics-Poll.aspx?. The poor reputation of lawyers for honesty and ethics appears, 
moreover, to have been fairly durable, at least in the recent past. See John A. Humbach, Abuse 
of Confidentiality and Fabricated Controversy: Two Proposals, 11 PROF‘L LAW. 1, 1 (Summer 
2000). 
 8. At any rate, my own experience (albeit undocumented) is that lawyers‘ professional 
propensity to avoid outright falsehoods is, if anything, well above the average.  
 9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009) (A lawyer shall not ―fail 
to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [confidentiality].‖) 
(emphasis added). 
 10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (―[A] lawyer shall abide 
by the client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation . . . .‖). By ―justice‖ I 
am referring to legal justice, and I mean to set aside for the present purposes the difficult 
questions that can arise when laws are perceived to be morally unjust. These latter questions are 
important, to be sure, but the present focus is on the tensions that result when lawyers think they 
must endeavor to defeat the outcomes that the substance of the law prescribes. See WILLIAM H. 
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 138 and passim (1998) 
(arguing that lawyers can avoid promoting legal injustice by taking a broader ―contextual‖ view 
when making legal-ethics judgments).  
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winning rather than doing what is ―right‖11—especially if doing what is right 
would require the lawyer to become judge and jury of the lawyer‘s own client. 
Lawyers do not generally view it as part of their professional role to be 
personally responsible for getting at the truth of the matter but, rather, to 
persuade others to believe or accept whatever interpretation of the raw evidence 
is most beneficial to the interests of their own clients. While telling lies is 
definitely out of bounds,
12
 taking advantage of others‘ mistakes and 
misapprehensions is not, and trying to bend others‘ perceptions to the client‘s 
best advantage is seen to be at the heart of good advocacy.  
The low public opinion of lawyers‘ honesty and ethical standards cannot, 
moreover, be blamed on the fact (if it is a fact) that lawyers are ignorant of or 
ignore the prescriptions of the applicable ethical codes.
13
 The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, despite their various exhortations to honesty, leave 
ample room for an approach to adversary advocacy in which getting at the truth 
can be a lesser value than victory on the client‘s behalf. This appears, at any 
rate, to be the accepted understanding of portions of the Model Rules that bear 
on the lawyer‘s duty of diligence,14 confidentiality,15 scope of representation 
(the lawyer‘s role),16 meritorious claims and contentions,17 and truthfulness in 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer should . 
. . take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or 
endeavor.‖); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009) (―[L]awyers usually defer 
to the client regarding such questions as . . . concern for third persons who might be adversely 
affected.‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 (2000) (―[A] 
lawyer may take any lawful measure within the scope of representation that is reasonably 
calculated to advance the client‘s objectives as defined by the client . . . .‖) (emphasis added); 
SIMON, supra note 10, at 26 (observing that, under the dominant view ―the client has a right to 
the type of lawyering it prescribes, even when such lawyering leads to injustice for others‖). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (2000) (setting out a lawyer‘s obligations regarding 
―False Testimony or Evidence‖). 
 13. While it may be true that many or most lawyers are not intimately familiar with the 
exact language of the Model Rules or other applicable codes, it is probably fair to say that most 
lawyers know their general substance, especially as regards the questions of honesty and truth to 
be considered in this article. 
 14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer should . . . 
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or endeavor. 
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with 
zeal in advocacy upon the client‘s behalf.‖); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY 
Canon 7 (1980) (―A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the 
Law‖). Even though in the ABA‘s current Model Rules the reference to ―zealous‖ advocacy is 
now in a comment rather than a rule, MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009),  
its message remains one that most lawyers take seriously. 
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). Rule 1.6 operates as a qualifier to 
other Model Rules and comments that, in their direct terms, would otherwise call for a higher 
standard of candor and ―honesty.‖ See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b), 8.1(b) 
(2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2, 1.16 cmt. 3 (2009).  
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.1.2(a) (2009) (―[A] lawyer shall abide by a 




 Rules such as these seem to assume, if not actually 
prescribe, a vision of the adversary system in which lawyers work single-
mindedly on behalf of their clients—a system in which lawyers can be trusted 
to pursue their clients‘ interests vigorously but cannot, and should not, be 
trusted in much else. 
Moreover, instead of prescribing a single standard of honesty for all 
situations, the Model Rules contain a multi-standard hierarchy of candor in 
which lawyers are required to be more honest in some situations than in 
others.
19
 For example, lawyers have a higher duty of candor to the courts than 
they do to each other or to the public generally: To the ―tribunal‖ the lawyer has 
a duty to take ―reasonable remedial measures‖ whenever the lawyer knows that 
anybody, client or otherwise, intends to engage in or does engage in fraudulent 
or criminal conduct related to the proceeding,
20
 and to take these measures 
―even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6.‖21 By contrast, when dealing with other lawyers or the public 
generally, the lawyer‘s affirmative duty to speak is limited to cases of client 
fraud or criminality, and even then, the duty is subject to the confidentiality 
strictures of Rule 1.6.
22
   
The Model Rules also prescribe a third level of honesty and candor, 
applicable with respect to disciplinary matters and admissions to the bar. Under 
this standard, a lawyer ―shall not . . . fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the [lawyer] to have arisen in the matter.‖23 In its 
general requirement, at least, this obligation is quite high, requiring lawyers not 
merely to avoid causing others to err in apprehending the truth, but also to 
                                                                                                                 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .‖). 
 17. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (ethical obligation ―to use 
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖). As observed supra note 3, the 
conception of ―meritorious‖ in Rule 3.1 seems to rest more on whether a claim or defense is 
winnable on the available admissible evidence than on whether the actual underlying facts 
justify victory under substance of the law. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000) (defining a position as frivolous when there is ―no substantial 
possibility that the tribunal would accept it‖). Indeed, the whole story of the ways lawyers use 
the rules of evidence to keep out anything damaging and to get in anything that can sway the 
factfinder‘s sympathies is a prime example of the ―duty to use legal procedure for the fullest 
benefit of the client‘s cause . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009).  
 18. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). As will be discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 87–120, it would appear that the meaning of Rule 4.1(b) has been modified 
considerably as a result of the 2003 amendment to MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) 
(2009) (confidentiality).  
 19. See immediately following text and infra text accompanying notes 159–71. 
 20. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009). 
 21. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2009). Rule 1.6 generally prohibits 
disclosure of any ―information relating to the representation of a client.‖ MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). 
 22. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). 
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009). 
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correct them when the lawyer knows they have gotten it wrong, irrespective of 
whether the lawyer (or client) did anything to bring about the error.
24
 The 
obligation is, however, subordinate to the lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality, 
which may appreciably undercut its impact.
25
 Notably, though, a similar and 
apparently even higher standard of honesty applies to lawyer advertising 
material, which the Model Rules consider ―false or misleading if it contains a 
material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the 
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.‖26 This standard of 
honesty seems even higher than the disciplinary/admissions standard because it 
is not made subordinate to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality).
27
 
Clearly the drafters of the Model Rules knew how to write rules that call 
for truly honest behavior, as they showed when it came to questions of lawyer 
advertising, bar admission, and discipline. However, they chose to write a 
different standard of honesty and candor when it came to fashioning the rule on 
―Truthfulness in Statements to Others.‖28 Apparently what is good for potential 
clients and for the bar admission and disciplinary authorities is not so good, or 
at least not deemed necessary, for the members of the public generally. 
The multi-level duty of candor in the Model Rules, with at least four 
different standards, has the effect, if not the purpose, of allowing lawyers in 
most situations to take advantage of misapprehensions ―known . . . to have 
arisen in the matter‖29 instead of trying to correct such misapprehensions. This 
ability to take such advantage of others‘ mistakes is not, however, intrinsic to or 
an inseparable part of an adversary system. While the adversarial process pre-
supposes that each side will labor mightily to present evidence favorable to it 
and to press for favorable inferences, an adversary system does not necessarily 
require calculated nondisclosure of unfavorable evidence or the urging of 
inferences known to be dubious or outright false.
30
 It is only in an exaggerated 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id.  
 25. Because the obligation is subordinate to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality), it may sometimes 
result in a higher and sometimes a lower level of candor than that which applies before a 
tribunal—depending on whether the information in question is protected by Rule 1.6. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that the recent amendments to Rule 1.6 significantly contract the 
reach of the duty of confidentiality, the scope of the lawyer‘s duty to warn under 8.1(b) is 
presumably expanded. See infra text accompanying notes 87–120. 
 26. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 7.1. cmt. 2 (2009): 
A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's 
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is 
also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to 
formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is 
no reasonable factual foundation. 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2009). 
 28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009). 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009). 
 30. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
543, 553–54 (1983) (arguing that the ―paramount goal‖ of civil adjudication is ―arriving at as 
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or extreme version of the adversary system that efforts to game the process, 
caginess about the evidence, the undermining of truthful testimony, and other 
such tactics would be considered normal and legitimate parts of the lawyer‘s 
task. 
This is not to say that an exaggerated or extreme version of the adversary 
system is not without its uses (albeit some of them questionable). For example, 
an advocate who distracts from the truth or takes advantage of others‘ mistakes 
can cause the law to misfire by making it apply to counterfactual versions of 
events. By engaging in such strategies, lawyers can become powerful allies of 
people who would prefer to escape the legally-prescribed consequences of their 
acts or to obtain outcomes they are not entitled to under the substance of the 
law. Since many people may prefer to avoid the legally-prescribed 
consequences of their acts or to obtain legally unmerited benefits, one may 
suppose that there is a substantial demand for lawyers who are willing to apply 
their skills to make such outcomes possible. Moreover, the ability to hold 
oneself out simply as a ―confidential advisor‖ gives lawyers a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace for consulting, an advantage that is not shared by 
others who provide similar services, such as accountants, management 
consultants, investment advisors, tax preparers, domestic counselors, realtors, 
and so on.
31
 As Professor Daniel Fischel has pointed out, the bulletproof 
confidentiality supposedly required in our version of the adversary system gives 
lawyers a legal monopoly on confidential advising and this, in turn, allows 
lawyers to extract ―monopoly rents‖ (higher fees) from their clientele.32 
However, a decidedly positive value of an exaggerated version of the adversary 
system is that it can serve as a bulwark to protect individuals and private 
interests against government. For a people who have been constitutionally 
                                                                                                                 
accurate a reconstruction of the past event as is possible‖ and advocating a set of rules, such as 
those originally proposed by Marvin Frankel, requiring lawyers to reveal witnesses they do not 
intend to offer, to report untrue statements and material omissions, and to question witnesses 
―with [a]  purpose and design to elicit the whole truth‖). 
 31. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1998). 
 32. Id. (―unique advantage‖). In principle, the bulletproof confidentiality ―feature‖ of 
lawyer‘s services would be available only to communications that are also covered by the 
attorney-client privilege, a rule of evidence that is appreciably narrower in scope than the ethical 
duty of confidentiality. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Ch. 5 
introductory note (2000); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000). See generally CHARLES 
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 296 and 242–311 (1986). Only information covered by 
the attorney-client privilege is immune to subpoena or other legal orders to divulge. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS  § 64 (2000). However, even though a lawyer can be judicially compelled to reveal 
information that is protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality (absent a privilege), the need 
to obtain the required court orders and to show justification for them can operate as an 
enormous practical barrier to disclosure, with a corresponding enhancement to the market value 
of the lawyer‘s position as confidential advisor. 
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suspicious of government since the earliest days of the Republic,
33
 having the 
laws unfailingly applied according to their tenor is not necessarily a good thing. 
It is something that may vary with the moral justness of the law. 
Unfortunately, however, whatever may be the benefits of an extreme 
version of the adversary system, they often come at the expense of truth. For 
some, this is not necessarily a problem. It has been suggested, for example, that 
―in actual practice the ascertainment of the truth is not necessarily the target of 
the trial, [and] that values other than truth frequently take precedence.‖34 To be 
sure, the legal system implements a variety of policies that can serve as 
―barriers to information‖ and frustrate the search for truth.35 Nonetheless, the 
decision to allow these barriers to exist is (or should be) a hard one. After all, 
people can be subjected to economic ruination, sent to prison, and even put to 
death
36
 based on the erroneous conceptions of ―truth‖ that emerge when 
relevant evidence is systematically excluded from consideration—such as when 
it is excluded based on an evidentiary ―privilege.‖ However, even if there are 
some important policies that do justify barriers to information, it does not 
follow that just any policy will justify such barriers. In particular, neither the 
bar‘s interest in receiving ―monopoly rents‖ nor the wrongdoer‘s interest in 
avoiding the law‘s consequences would seem to present a strong policy basis 
for frustrating the search for truth. The interest of protecting individual and 
private interests against government may offer a philosophically more 
appealing justification for an exaggerated or extreme adversary system, since 
such a system literally condones the passive obstruction, and indeed some 
active obstruction, of government justice in the name of liberty and human 
dignity.
37
 However, it is doubtful that a legal system could entertain a policy 
that supports such ―obstruction‖ explicitly without either imposing very strict 
limits, such as the bounds of our constitutional rights, or engaging in profound 
self-contradiction. 
There is no reason to believe that our own legal system contains any such 
explicit self-contradiction. Nevertheless, the multi-level duty of candor in the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The Constitution, for example, contains numerous expressions of suspicion of 
government and of the need for citizens to be protected from government, ranging from the 
rights of the accused through the protections afforded to private property. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. 
AMENDS. IV–VI (granting rights regarding illegal search and seizure, private property, due 
process, and self-incrimination, along with the right to counsel and a jury trial). 
 34. The Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer’s Role and Responsibility in Modern 
Society, 30 REC. ASS‘N B. CITY N.Y. 534, 543 (1975).  
 35. Id. at 544–45. Rifkind lists, among other things, evidentiary privileges, constitutional 
exclusionary rules, and standards of witness ―competence‖ to testify. 
 36. As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out, evidence of ―actual innocence‖ is not in 
itself a basis to set aside a state death sentence once the judgment has become final. Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393, 400 (1993). The Court was concerned about ―the very disruptive 
effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital 
cases.‖ Id. at 417. 
 37. This is probably what Rifkind had in mind when he said that the adversary system is 
―good for liberty.‖ Rifkind, supra note 34, at 537. 
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Model Rules not only allows lawyers to take advantage of misapprehensions 
known to have arisen on the part of others, but also to take active steps to 
induce such misapprehensions—as long as the lawyer can do so without 
resorting to outright lies or evidence tampering. One of the lawyer‘s most 
valuable skills is the ability to weave stories that are false out of statements that 
are true. To reiterate, however, a policy that allows such tactics is not a 
necessary part of the adversary system. So why do the Model Rules leave so 
much room to make this possible? 
The Model Rules are not the ethical rules that one would expect to find in a 
world of truly honest lawyers—not with their multi-level concept of candor and 
their various provisions allowing lawyers to subordinate the revelation of truth 
to the value of winning.
38
 In a world of truly honest lawyers, members of the 
profession would never subordinate justice to victory by taking advantage of 
others‘ errors or misunderstandings, let alone seek—by selective disclosures or 
the like—to create such advantages. In other words, in such a world lawyers 
could be trusted. While truly honest lawyers can no doubt survive and possibly 
even thrive under a Model Rules regime,
39
 they would not likely be the norm, 
nor would they be the sort of lawyers that are apparently presupposed by the 
Model Rules themselves. And, they would certainly not be the lawyers you 
would want if you deserve to suffer some legal sanction or if you desire to 
obtain some benefit that you do not legally deserve. 
There are, however, signs that an evolution is occurring in the legal 
profession‘s view of honesty and the lawyer‘s role, as well as in the Model 
Rules. After twice rejecting a crime/fraud exception to the lawyer‘s duty of 
confidentiality, first in 1982 and then again in 2002,
40
 the American Bar 
Association finally embraced a qualified crime/fraud exception in 2003.
41
 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See infra text accompanying notes 121–81. 
 39. See generally John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An 
Essay on Honesty, “Lawyer Honesty” and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV. 
93 (1999) (discussing the competitive advantage that would be enjoyed by lawyers whom others 
could trust without reservation). See also William H. Simon, Moral Freaks: Lawyers’ Ethics  in 
Academic Perspective (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, 
Paper No. 09-215), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496988 (arguing that it is a common 
error to overstate the distance between ordinary law and legal ethics, especially as purposively 
understood).  
 40. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND 
STANDARDS 69–71 (2004) (describing the legislative history of Rule 1.6). Irma Russell describes 
the 2002 rejection as ―a partial triumph of an absolutist view of confidentiality.‖ Irma Russell, 
Client Confidences and Public Confidence in the Legal Profession: Observations on the ABA 
House of Delegates Deliberations on the Duty of Confidentiality, 13 PROF. LAW. 19, 19 (Spring 
2002) (describing the original rule as, essentially, reflecting an absolutist view of 
confidentiality). 
 41. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 40, at 71. The ―qualification‖ of this qualified exception 
is that the crime or fraud must be such that it is ―reasonably certain to result in [or has resulted 
in] substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which 
the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
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Notably, amendments to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality) may breathe a new and 
powerful life into Rule 4.1 (truthfulness to others), even though the language of 
the latter remains unchanged.
42
 Perhaps the extreme adversarial vision of the 
American legal system that was built into the Model Rules is being taken out 
again. Perhaps, indeed, the Model Rules will soon evolve to the point where 
truly honest legal practice, more concerned with truth than persuasion, with 
legal justice than mere victory, will be not merely permitted but actually 
fostered by the lawyers‘ code of ethics.  
In the remainder of this article, the overall focus is on the duties that 
lawyers have under the Model Rules to warn others laboring under 
misapprehensions of material fact. We will begin with a look at the duty to 
warn of client fraud or criminality under the original version of Rule 1.6 
(confidentiality) as it was understood before and after the recent amendments—
particularly in light of ABA Formal Opinion 92-366 (on so-called ―noisy 
withdrawal‖).43 This will be followed by consideration of a duty not to take 
advantage of others‘ misapprehensions of material facts, setting certain 
practices of lawyers against standards applied in the common law of larceny.
44
 
Finally, we will look at the ethical aspects of using the legal process proactively 
as part of an endeavor to induce a court to take property away from its owner 
and give it to somebody else.
45
 
I. THE LAWYER‘S DUTY TO WARN OF CLIENT FRAUD OR 
 CRIMINALITY (―NOISY WITHDRAWAL‖) 
Before the Model Rules were adopted, the ABA‘s model ethical standards 
did not require lawyers to keep client information confidential if disclosure was 
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime.
46
 Instead, in the pre-
Model Rules days a lawyer was ethically permitted (though not required) to 
disclose a client‘s secrets in order to protect the potential victims of a client‘s 
criminal fraud.
47
 However, in adopting the Model Rules in 1983, the ABA 
                                                                                                                 
1.6(b) (2009). For a further description of these changes, see Amanda Vance & Randi Wallach, 
Updating Confidentiality: An Overview of the Recent Changes to Model Rule 1.6, 17 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1003 (2004). 
 42. See infra text accompanying notes 87–120. 
 43. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992) 
(hereinafter Formal Opinion 92-366). 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 121–211. 
 45. See infra text accompanying notes 212–73.  
 46. ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS Canon 37 (1937), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 323–24 
(1997) (―The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the 
confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be 
necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.‖); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101(C)(3) (1979) (―A lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his 
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.‖). 
 47. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101(C)(3) (1979). 
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decided to break with this tradition. The House of Delegates voted to reject 
proposals that would have retained lawyers‘ broad ethical liberty to disclose 
client information in order to prevent their client‘s crimes.48 Instead, the ABA 
adopted a very narrow ―crime‖ exception to the duty of confidentiality, 
applying only in cases where the client‘s criminal activities were ―likely to 
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.‖49 There was no exception 
at all for cases of client frauds or crimes that would merely cause serious 
financial losses or damage to property interests. The lawyer‘s ethical duty of 
confidentiality had reached a new modern high.  
Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1992, the ABA's Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility recognized in Formal Opinion 92-366 
that lawyers sometimes are not merely permitted but ethically required to make 
certain disclosures of confidential client information in order to avoid 
―assisting‖ in a client‘s prospective crime or fraud.50 This obligation was 
discovered to be rooted in existing Model Rule 1.2(d), which declares: ―A 
lawyer shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal 
or fraudulent . . . .‖51 The formal opinion reasoned that sometimes the lawyer 
may be unable to meet this ethical prohibition against ―assisting‖ a client‘s 
crime or fraud by merely withdrawing from representation.
52
 A typical situation 
where this inability might occur is when the client is planning to use documents 
previously drafted by the lawyer in order to carry out a post-withdrawal fraud or 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 32 
(6th ed. 2002) (hereinafter GILLERS). Under the January 1980 draft of the pertinent provision, ―a 
lawyer may disclose information about a client . . . to the extent it appears necessary to prevent 
or rectify the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the client.” Id. Under the 
subsequent May 1981 draft, the scope of the permission to disclose would have been 
substantially narrower than under the 1980 draft, though still unacceptably generous from the 
standpoint of the ABA:  
[A] lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer believes 
necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or 
property of another [or] or rectify the consequences of a criminal or fraudulent act in the 
commission of which the lawyer‘s services had been used. 
 Id. (first alteration in orginal). It too was rejected. 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1997) (former version, now 
superseded), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 27 (1997). An excellent analysis of the original and 
revised versions of the ―bodily harm‖ exception is found in Russell, supra note 40, at 19–21 
(describing the original rule as, essentially, reflecting an ―absolutist view of confidentiality‖). 
 50. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43. 
 51. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009). 
 52. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
1.16(a)(1) (2009) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation if ―the representation will 
result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.‖ An example would be if 
the representation would assist the client in committing a crime or fraud in violation of Rule 
1.2). 




 In situations such as this, the only way the lawyer can avoid assisting 
the client‘s wrong may be a so-called ―noisy withdrawal,‖ that is, a withdrawal 
accompanied by notice to the affected parties and, even, an express disavowal 
of prior work product.
54
 The Committee‘s majority located this requirement of 
noisy withdrawal not in any one rule but in the interplay between several 





the scope of representation.
57
 In short, the disclosure requirement of Formal 
Opinion 92-366 emerges when, due to the continuing effects of the lawyer‘s 
prior representation, disclosure is the only way for the lawyer to avoid 
―assisting‖ the client‘s crime or fraud. 
The formal opinion was based on certain assumed facts, which in highly 
simplified form are: A lawyer has represented Client, a small corporation, for 
several years.
58
 About a year ago, Client obtained a $5 million bank loan, and 
in that connection, the lawyer provided the customary opinion letter.
59
 The 
letter stated that all of Client‘s outstanding sales contracts were enforceable 
obligations against Client‘s customers.60 Now two senior officers of Client have 
just told the lawyer that for the past several years they have been creating phony 
purchase orders.
61
 These phony orders make Client‘s sales figures look much 
greater than they actually are and, also, make the lawyer‘s opinion letter 
inaccurate.
62
 Nevertheless, Client intends to continue using the letter 
fraudulently in its ongoing dealings with the bank, including an existing line of 
credit, and possibly in a future major loan as well.
63
  
In a world of truly honest lawyers this kind of situation would not present 
any quandary at all, much less one that calls for a request for expert ethics 
advice with a sharply divided opinion as the result.
64
 Not only has an innocent 
person fallen into a trap that the lawyer helped to set (albeit unconsciously), but 
the client‘s intention to continue making use of the lawyer‘s letter means that 
the trap is an ongoing menace into the future. Whatever the lawyer‘s absence of 
fault in the first instance, it simply would not be truly honest to leave victims in 
the traps that one has created, let alone leave the traps lying around to be 
blundered into again. The client has not merely told a serious lie and obtained 
millions of dollars by doing it, but the lawyer‘s past services are helping the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43. 
 54. Id. 
 55. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
 56. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2009). See supra note 52 for excerpt. 
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009). 
 58. Formal Opinion 92–366, supra note 43. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The formal opinion was accompanied by a strong dissent, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 80–84.  
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client advance similar ―interests‖ in the future. If the client cannot be persuaded 
to reveal the lie, then the truly honest lawyer would have to do so. 
The formal opinion did not, however, go quite this far. It concluded that, 
based on the Model Rules, the lawyer would have to make a disclosure in a 
situation like this, but the rules would not require or even permit the lawyer to 
explain the truth.
65
 They would not allow the lawyer to set things straight or to 
provide whatever facts might be reasonably required to correct the client‘s 
crime or fraud or to prevent it in the future.
66
 On the contrary, the 
―disaffirmance should . . . go no further than necessary to accomplish its 
purpose of avoiding the lawyer‘s assisting the client‘s fraud.‖67 If the client can 
carry out its criminal or fraudulent scheme without making further use of the 
lawyer‘s assistance or past work, then so be it. The point of a noisy withdrawal 
is, it seems, not so much to protect the public as to keep the lawyer clean, under 
Rule 1.2(d). It does not prevent the clients from committing fraud but merely 
prevents them from conscripting their lawyers into ―a de facto continuation of 
the representation even if the lawyer has ceased to perform any additional 
work.‖68  
The reasoning of the formal opinion began with an admission that the 
Model Rules nowhere explicitly authorize the disclosure that the opinion 
decides is required.
69
 The opinion noted, however, that a comment to Rule 1.6 
(confidentiality) clearly presupposed that the rule would allow noisy 
withdrawals.
70
  According to the comment in question, Rule 1.6 does not 
prevent a lawyer from ―giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer 
may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the 
like.‖71 The formal opinion treated this comment‘s apparent exception to 
confidentiality as a correct interpretation of Rule 1.6 even though, only six 
months before adopting the comment, the ABA had refused to adopt a draft of 
Rule 1.6 that would have permitted such disclosures explicitly.
72
 The rejected 
draft, which would have continued the general spirit of the traditional rule, 
permitted disclosure in cases of client fraud or crime as an explicit exception to 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (―[T]he text of [Rule 1.6 (confidentiality)] itself contains no exception that would 
permit her to reveal the fraud to the bank, . . . to the new law firm the company has retained, or 
to anyone else. Nor is disclosure explicitly authorized by any other ethical rule.‖). 
 70. Id. In a subsequent amendment in 2003, the ABA has since deleted the supporting 
language in question from the comment, apparently because a similar passage had previously 
been added in 2002 to the comments to Rule 1.2 and Rule 4.1. See infra note 84 and 
accompanying text. 
 71. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2003), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 40 
(2003). 
 72. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43. 
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the duty of confidentiality.
73
 However, in an effort to square the comment‘s 
language with the rejection of the draft 1.6, the formal opinion pointed out that 
the comment‘s interpretation of Rule 1.6 (to allow noisy withdrawal) was ―sub-
stantially narrower‖ than the much broader permissions to disclose that the 
rejected draft would have conferred.
74
 Indeed, the formal opinion questioned 
whether allowing noisy withdrawal really constituted an ―exception‖ to 
confidentiality at all.
75
 It was, rather, simply ―the inevitable consequence[] of 
one rule‘s operation upon another‖ and ―a recognition that fulfillment of the 
lawyer‘s obligations under Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 1.2(d) may have the collateral 
effect of inferentially revealing a confidence.‖76 
Notably, the crucial language of the comment on which the formal opinion 
relied was
77
 permissive rather than mandatory.
78
 Nowhere did the comment 
state that lawyers might ever have an ethical ―duty‖ to disclose client 
information in order to avoid assisting in clients‘ crime or fraud. However, in 
the course of the formal opinion‘s line of reasoning, the comment‘s permission 
to disclose got transmuted into a duty to disclose when the circumstances make 
disclosure the only way the lawyer can avoid having his or her work product 
used to assist a crime or fraud.
79
  
It probably would go too far to say that Formal Opinion 92-366 settled the 
issue of noisy withdrawal. For one thing there was a strong dissent, which 
rejected the notion that the lawyer‘s past work product is the equivalent of 
current and continuing ―representation.‖80 By rejecting this notion, the dissent 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). Rule 1.16(a)(1) states that ―[A] lawyer . . . shall withdraw from 
the representation of a client if . . . the representation will result in [sic] violation of the rules of 
professional conduct or other law . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2009). 
Rule 1.2(d) states that ―[a] lawyer shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows 
is criminal or fraudulent . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009). 
 77. The past tense is used here because the comment in question has since been amended. 
See supra note 70.  
 78. Formal Op. 92-366, supra note 43. (―Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 
1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may 
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.‖).  
 79. Id. In line with the opinion‘s reasoning, before there can be a permission to disclose 
under the comment to Rule 1.6, there would have to be an obligation to disclose under Model 
Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 1.2(d). Id. Accordingly, there can be a permission to disclose only where 
there is a duty to disclose. Id. 
 80. Id. (dissent). The dissenters did not agree that a client‘s post-withdrawal use of a 
lawyer‘s work product constitutes continuing representation. Id. Because the dissent rejected the 
notion that ―past completed representation‖ could be ―miraculously resurrected and revivified 
into a current representation,‖ the dissent did not see the use by the client of an ―old opinion 
letter‖ as representation—ergo, there could not be the predicate ―representation‖ requiring 
further withdrawal, ―noisy‖ or otherwise. Id. ―Model Rule 1.16(a)(1), thus, clearly contemplates 
mandatory withdrawal only if future ongoing representational services will be improperly used 
1006 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:993 
 
was able to conclude that disaffirmances of work-product should neither be 
required nor permitted.
81
 Another reason the formal opinion does not settle the 
issue of noisy withdrawal is that it was, in the final analysis, only the view of a 
committee within a private organization, and it may well be at odds with the 
strong stance towards confidentiality that most lawyers hold. Among 
practitioners, the core value that lawyers do not squeal on clients runs deep, and 
different lawyers may reach their own, alternative syntheses of the various 
applicable rules. A technical objection to the majority‘s conclusion is that it is 
very hard to reconcile with the comments to Rule 4.1, which specifically deals 
with the problem of disclosures to avoid ―assisting.‖82 The comments to that 
rule, both at the time of the formal opinion and now, expressly subordinate the 
lawyer‘s duty to disclose to the duty of confidentiality.83 Finally, there is the 
awkward point that crucial comment language on which the majority relied has 
been removed from Rule 1.6 and relocated to comments on other rules
84
 where 
it may no longer be so easy to treat as an ―interpretation‖ of Rule 1.6. 
The most problematic feature of the formal opinion is, however, its 
essentially binary character. The lawyer under the assumed facts had already 
concluded that she could no longer continue representing this client and that 
she was required to withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(a).
85
 The only question 
                                                                                                                 
by the client. Only then would a ‗noisy withdrawal‘ be permissible.‖ Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) cmts. 2–3 (2009); see also supra note 
9 for relevant text of rule. 
 83. Former comment 3 to Model Rule 4.1 read: ―The requirement of disclosure created by 
this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6.‖ MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 3 (1992) (amended 2003). The current version of the comment is 
similar. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009).  
 84. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009); see also supra 
note 70. In the comments to Rule 1.2, the language reads: ―It may be necessary [to avoid 
‗assisting‘] for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, 
document, affirmation, or the like.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 (2009). 
While this addition to the comments to Rule 1.2 is arguably even more empowering than the 
language that was removed from Rule 1.6, the relocation of the thought from 1.6 to 1.2 makes it 
far less obvious that the language should be treated as an interpretation of Rule 1.6. For one 
thing, it would be odd to find such a significant interpretive qualification of Rule 1.6 set out in 
the comments to an altogether different rule. Moreover, in the new comment to Rule 1.2, the 
language in question is immediately followed by the reference ―See Rule 4.1.‖ Id. Since the duty 
to volunteer information under Rule 4.1 is made expressly subject to the duty of confidentiality 
of Rule 1.6, so too, arguably, are the duties to ―give notice‖ and ―disaffirm‖ under Rule 1.2. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009). At least, the comment that 
expressly mentions those duties seems, with its reference to 4.1, to imply as much. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 (2009). In other words, the net result may be that, in 
those circumstances where Rule 1.6 requires confidentiality, noisy withdrawal may arguably no 
longer be permitted and the duty not to assist by silence is now qualified by the duty of 
confidentiality (albeit a more limited duty under the recent amendments to Rule 1.6). See infra 
text accompanying notes 87–120. 
 85. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.  
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left for her was what, if anything, she was permitted or required to say about 
her former client in the course of withdrawing. It is far more likely that a lawyer 
will encounter the problem of client misconduct in circumstances that are rather 
less dramatic than a $5 million fraud committed in a single, relatively large 
transaction. What, for example, of all the little ―crimes or frauds‖ that a 
corporate client‘s personnel might commit in the course of cutting corners on 
the innumerable rules and regulations—from employee safety and protecting 
the environment to financial and securities reporting, maintaining needed 
permits, and all the rest—that are a part of doing business in a modern 
regulatory state? The trouble with Formal Opinion 92-366 is that it seems to 
presuppose that the lawyer either succeeds in getting the client to get into full 
legal compliance or the lawyer must get out—mandating withdrawal at least 
with respect to any legal services in which the lawyer might be deemed to 
―assist.‖86 However, real life is not quite so binary; it is not so clear-cut in the 
choices it presents. For clients doing business in a modern regulatory state, the 
ways of breaking the law are so numerous, and competitive pressures to shade 
the truth so intense, that it may be relatively unusual for lawyers to withdraw 
their assistance every time they know (or ought to know) that their clients‘ 
ongoing operations are not in full and punctilious compliance with all the many 
laws. 
Whatever its weaknesses and uncertainties, however, Formal Opinion 92-
366 is clear authority for the proposition that the Model Rules as originally 
promulgated by the ABA did impose a duty to warn, after a fashion, of a 
client‘s impending crime or fraud. The warning was not permitted to be 
specific, nor could it presumably even be phrased as a warning per se. 
Nevertheless, the Model Rules did impose a duty to speak, as a last resort, 
when a lawyer‘s pre-existing work product was going to be used by a former 
client in a future crime or fraud. 
II. THE LAWYER‘S DUTY TO WARN UNDER MODEL RULE 4.1 AFTER 
 THE RECENT AMENDMENTS 
Prior to 2003, there were two very narrow classes of explicit exceptions to 
the duty of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6, namely (1) to prevent death or 
substantial bodily harm,
87
 and (2) to protect the lawyer.
88
 The Model Rules did 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. The formal opinion did allege the possibility that a lawyer could withdraw as to the 
―matters relating to the fraud‖ (or crime?) without severing the entire relationship. Id. However, 
that particular gambit may seem fairly unrealistic for many who are in-house counsel and 
probably would not work very well for outside counsel either.  
 87. See GILLERS & SIMON,  supra note 40, at 69–71 (history of Rule 1.6); see also Russell, 
supra note 40, at 19 (discussing remedial changes to Rule 1.6). The ―death or bodily harm‖ 
exception was expanded in 2002 from an ultra-narrow exception (for cases of ―imminent‖ death 
or substantial bodily harm threatened by a client‘s crime) to a considerably broader one (for 
cases of ―reasonably certain‖ death or substantial bodily harm, from whatever cause‖). GILLERS 
& SIMON, supra note 40, at 69–71. 
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not, however, explicitly obligate or even permit a lawyer to disclose client 
confidences in order to prevent fraud or otherwise to protect the financial or 
property interests of others. As previously mentioned, this sweeping breadth of 
the Model Rules‘ confidentiality duty was in sharp contrast with the ABA‘s 
earlier Model Code and Canons of Professional Ethics.
89
 However, in 2003 
there was a return to something approximating the traditional contours of the 
confidentiality duty when the ABA approved extensive amendments to Model 
Rule 1.6. Under these 2003 amendments: 
 A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
 . . .  
 (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using 
the lawyer's services; 
 (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of 
which the client has used the lawyer's services . . . .
90
 
In other words, with certain qualifications, the newly modified Rule 1.6 
now explicitly permits lawyers to reveal confidential client information in order 
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify financial or property injuries due to the client‘s 
crime or fraud.
91
 The main pre-requisites for the exception are, first, that the 
injury in question must be ―substantial‖ and second, that the client must have 
used the lawyer‘s services ―in furtherance of‖ the crime or fraud.92  
By using the word ―may‖ in the introductory clause, this new amendment 
to Rule 1.6 appears to permit but not require lawyers to disclose client 
information for the protection of others.
93
 However, when the newly amended 
version of Rule 1.6 is read in combination with the already existing language of 
Rule 4.1(b), the Model Rules now indeed appear to charge lawyers with an 
ethical obligation to disclose. Specifically, under the relevant language of Rule 
4.1, ―[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . 
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Sometimes referred to as the ―self-defense‖ exceptions, these allow the lawyer to 
breach confidentiality to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to collect the fee or 
otherwise to mount an effective case in litigation with a former client. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) & cmts. 10–11 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §6.7.8 
(1986). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 90. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
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assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited 
by Rule 1.6.‖94 Although the language of Rule 4.1 has not changed, the newest 
amendments to Rule 1.6 have radically altered the practical meaning of its final 
clause, viz. ―unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.‖95 
Under the pre-2003 version of Rule 1.6, the main thrust of Rule 4.1(b) was 
essentially swallowed up by its final clause. While the subsection‘s first twenty-
one words seemed to mandate a fairly wide range of disclosures of material 
facts, the final clause cut down the duty to disclose to the point where it was, as 
a practical matter, miniscule. Nearly all useful information that a lawyer is 
likely to possess would normally be ―information relating to the representation‖ 
of a client and, therefore, locked up under Rule 1.6.
96
 To the extent that such 
information could not be revealed under Rule 1.6, it could not be revealed 
under the final clause of 4.1(b) either.
97
 And because the former version of 
Rule 1.6 had no crime or fraud exception, the reference to Rule 1.6 utterly 




Under the new version of Rule 1.6, however, the reach of Rule 4.1(b) has 
now been dramatically expanded. Rather than forbidding lawyers to divulge 
client information concerning client crimes or fraud, the new Rule 1.6 now 
broadly permits such disclosures.
99
 Since Rule 4.1(b) requires its disclosures 
when Rule 1.6 permits them, a new and wide-ranging ―duty to warn‖ has 
emerged.
100
 Whenever a lawyer believes that a Rule 4.1 disclosure is reasonably 
necessary to ―prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another, and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using 
the lawyer's services,‖ then disclosure by the lawyer seems not merely 
permitted by Rule 1.6 but required under a joint reading of Rules 1.6 and 
4.1.
101
 That is, at least, what the words say.  
Although some commentators agree with this reading,
102
 including 
inferentially an opinion of the Massachusetts Committee on Professional 
                                                                                                                 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009) (emphasis added).  
 95. Id.  
 96. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009). 
 97. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). 
 98. The main exception would seem to be for situations where a failure to disclose would 
actually be illegal. For example, under current Rule 1.2(d), which was added in 2002, the failure 
to disclose would cause the lawyer to personally commit a fraud. See United States v. Cavin, 39 
F.3d 1299, 1308–09 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing a number of circumstances to be considered in 
deciding whether a lawyer‘s failure to divulge potential damaging facts would constitute fraud 
by the lawyer).  
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2009). 
 100. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1(b) (2009). 
 101. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1 (2009). 
 102. Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the 
Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers' Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 
(2003) (―Corporate lawyers thus are now required by Model Rule 4.1 to disclose outside the 




 there is at least one important commentator who does not. The one 
who does not is, moreover, the Reporter for the Task Force of Corporate 
Responsibility, the committee that recommended (or, more precisely, re-
recommended) the 2003 amendments to the ABA‘s House of Delegates.104 
According to Reporter (and Professor) Lawrence Hamermesh, the Task Force 
certainly had ―no intention or expectation that it was recommending a 
mandatory disclosure obligation.‖105 Indeed, the Final Report of the Task Force 
says exactly that.
106
 Nonetheless, one is tempted here to advert to Justice 
Holmes‘s famous dictum on using legislative history in statutory interpretation: 
―I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know what the words 
mean.‖107 And the words—that is to say the words that were presented to and 
adopted by vote of the ABA House of Delegates—are diametrically opposed to 
the idea that the lawyer‘s disclosure obligations under Rule 4.1(b) are merely 




The Task Force was, of course, literally correct in saying that it did not 
recommend creating any new mandatory disclosure obligation, for the 
obligation in question was already in the existing language of Rule 4.1(b).
109
 
The new amendments to Rule 1.6 are, in themselves, merely permissive. What 
is more, the range of situations in which Rule 1.6 permits disclosure appears to 
be significantly broader than the range in which Rule 4.1(b) would require 
                                                                                                                 
corporation any ‗material fact . . . necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client.‘ It would be hard to make the point much more clearly.‖) (alteration in original). Cf. 
Jolyn M. Pope, Transactional Attorneys—The Forgotten Actors in Rule 1.6 Disclosure Dramas: 
Financial Crime and Fraud Mandate Permissive Disclosure of Confidential Information, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 145, 169–70 (2001) (recognizing the interpretation, but recommending deletion 
of Model Rule 4.1(b) to eliminate required disclosure). 
 103. See Mass. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 2 (1999) (interpreting the similar 
confidentiality exception in the requirements of Rule 8.3 (Reporting Professional Misconduct)).  
 104. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the 
2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 35 
(2003). 
 105. Id. at 54 n.92. 
 106. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 53 n.94 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporate 
responsibility/final_report.pdf. 
 107. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947). 
 108. I do not mean here to be facile about taking parties‘ intent seriously and carrying their 
intentions into force to the greatest extent possible. See infra text accompanying notes 252–73. 
However, it seems to me that, in the present context, the intentions that count are those of the 
―legislators‖ who had the legal power to vote on and adopt the measure, not the intent of the 
―legislative staff‖ personnel who originally wrote it. If the intention of those voting cannot be 
known, then their intention should be taken to be that which can reasonably be imputed to them 
based on the wording that they approved. 
 109. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). 




 To the extent that their ranges differ, it can quite properly be said 
that the 2003 amendments enacted a new zone of permission to disclose within 
which there is no corresponding duty to disclose.
111
 For instance, the chief 
relevant qualifier of Rule 4.1(b) is ―necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client,‖112 whereas the relevant qualifier of Rule 1.6(b)(2)–
(3) is ―in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's 
services.‖113 These qualifiers are not necessarily synonymous.114 Another 
example of the difference in range emerges from the permission in the new 
Rule 1.6 to disclose client information to ―prevent, mitigate or rectify‖ client 
crime or fraud, or its consequences.
115
 By contrast, Rule 4.1 mandates 
disclosure only to ―avoid assisting‖ a client‘s crime or fraud. It is debatable 
whether ―assisting‖ always necessarily includes any failure to ―prevent, 
mitigate or rectify.‖116  
Another way in which the ranges differ is due to the gap that exists 
between the set consisting of ―criminal or fraudulent‖ acts under Rule 4.1,117 
and the somewhat smaller set consisting of ―crime or fraud that is reasonably 
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another‖ found in Rule 1.6.118 Even after the 2003 amendments, Rule 1.6 still 
prohibits—as much as it ever did—disclosures of client information with 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1(b) (2009). 
 111. This distinction is noted by Ms. Pope, who sees the remedy as deletion of Rule 4.1(b). 
Pope, supra note 102, at 170 n.141.  
 112. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009) (emphasis added). 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2009). 
 114. For example, a lawyer who obtains the release of a professional pickpocket on bail 
could not, I think, be considered to have ―assisted‖ in the client‘s subsequent pocket picking 
without a radical re-thinking of the defense lawyer‘s duties in arraignments. Nonetheless, the 
services provided by the lawyer at the bail hearing might be seen as being ―in furtherance‖ of 
the pickpocket‘s trade. Cf. United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(sentencing lawyer to eighty-seven months after engaging in ―traditional litigation-related 
conduct‖ in an endeavor, later deemed ―corrupt,‖ to prevent a successful prosecution of his 
client on gambling charges). 
 115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
 116. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2009); see also Formal Opinion 92-
366, supra note 43, which appeared to take the view that a lawyer would not be ―assisting‖ (and 
therefore not required to do a ―noisy withdrawal‖) unless the client was intending to continue 
putting the lawyer‘s innocently provided legal services to nefarious use. In interpreting the 
analogous use of the word ―assist‖ in 1.2(d), the formal opinion stated:  
Similarly, under the injunction in Rule 1.2(d) that a lawyer shall not ―assist a client in 
conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,‖ the term ―assist‖ must be reasonably 
construed to cover a failure to repudiate or otherwise disassociate herself from prior work 
product the lawyer knows or has reason to believe is furthering the client's continuing or 
future criminal or fraudulent conduct.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009). 
 118. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
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respect to small-impact frauds or crimes, viz. those that produce only minor 
injuries or none at all.
119
 Thus, it seems a fair hypothesis that, for a substantial 
proportion of actual situations, the 2003 amendments to Rule 1.6 have no 
application at all, and the pre-2003 rules (including Formal Opinion 92-366) 
are still in full force, calling for mandatory noisy withdrawal (but only limited 
disclosures) for smaller injuries and required disclosures to avoid assisting for 
substantial-injury situations.  
Nevertheless, for those cases in which a client‘s crime or fraud has resulted 
in or is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests 
or property of another, the 2003 amendments to the Model Rules have made an 
important advance in the direction of truly honest lawyering. Even if one 
accepts the view of the Task Force, a lawyer now has, at the very least,  
permission to reveal information to the extent reasonably believed necessary to 
―prevent, mitigate or rectify‖ a client‘s fraud or crime that the lawyer‘s services 
have been used to further.
120
 And accepting the clear import of the language 
itself, a lawyer now has a duty to reveal. 
III. WHAT MAKES ―HONESTY‖ SO COMPLICATED? 
We have already seen that what counts as being honest has varied over time 
under the Canons, the Model Code, and now the Model Rules and their recent 
amendments. And this is not to mention the variations in the ethical content of 
lawyer honesty that exist from state to state.
121
 Then there are the arcane 
analytical contortions employed in Formal Opinion 92-366, which addressed 
what might seem to be a fairly basic ethical point in a ―cramped and legalistic 
way‖ rather than resort to high principles.122 Law students sometimes wonder, 
when trying to absorb and remember materials such as these, why is honesty so 
complicated? What can explain all these convolutions and twists? They, who 
have not quite yet adopted the mindset of a lawyer, are surprised by all this 
intricacy: Why do lawyers have such a hard time parsing out what it means to 
be honest? 
One of the complicating factors, if not the chief among them, is the vision 
that lawyers have of their own role under our prevailing version of the 
adversary system.
123
 As that role is explained in the Model Rules and 
comments, ―a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. For example, New Jersey requires disclosures to protect the financial interests of 
others, and fifteen other states permit such disclosures. GILLERS & SIMON supra note 40, at 73–
75. 
 122. GILLERS, supra note 48, at 620. 
 123. ―One of the basic tenets of our adversarial legal system is that the lawyer owes the 
client loyalty and zealous representation. That duty includes . . . confidentiality: as a general 
rule, the lawyer may not divulge client confidences except in very limited instances.‖ United 
States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 
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objectives of representation,‖124 and then ―take whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or endeavor‖125 by using 
―legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖ within the limits of 
―[t]he law, both procedural and substantive.‖126  
Obviously, this vision of the lawyer‘s central role leaves little room for 
reaching out to help the other side when it is about to make a blunder. On the 
contrary, it is a professional truism of current American legal practice that a 
lawyer has no general duty to volunteer.
127
  In our version of the adversary 
system, there is no general obligation to disabuse an opposing attorney even 
when the lawyer knows the other attorney is making an obvious mistake or 
laboring under serious misapprehensions of fact or law.
128
 In litigation, this lack 
of obligation means a lawyer does not have to call the opponent‘s attention to 
an error even when the lawyer can be virtually certain that the error will make 
the process go wrong, producing an outcome that the law was not substantively 
supposed to produce,
129
 in other words, a ―miscarriage‖ of justice. In 
transactions, it means that a lawyer need not inform the opposite party of key 
                                                                                                                 
 124. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009). 
 125. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 126. Id. 
 127. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer . . . generally has 
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts.‖); ABA Comm. on Ethics and 
Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994) (stating that there is no general duty to inform an 
opposing party and court that statute of limitations has run); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993) (stating that a lawyer has no general obligation to 
disclose information adverse to the client in the context of a bank examination); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. e (2000) (stating that there 
is ―no legal duty to make an affirmative disclosure of fact or law when dealing with a 
nonclient‖); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. f & 
Reporter‘s Notes cmt. f (2000) (recognizing greater duties to volunteer information in the case 
of lawyers representing government). But cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 387 (1994) (finding no basis in the rules for holding a lawyer representing a 
government agency to a different standard). 
 128. The litigating lawyer must, of course, disclose ―directly adverse‖ legal authority to the 
tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111(2) (2000). But this requirement is of scant help to an 
adversary or negotiating counterpart when the parties are not currently litigating. What is more, 
depending on the circumstances of the disclosure, its timing, and so on, the disclosure 
requirement may be of little aid to the unaware opponent in a lawsuit. 
 129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. b (2000).  
A lawyer might know of testimony or other evidence vital to the other party, but unknown 
to that party or their [sic] advocate. The advocate who knows of the evidence, and who has 
complied with applicable rules concerning pretrial discovery and other applicable 
disclosure requirements . . . , has no legal obligation to reveal the evidence, even though 
the proceeding thereby may fail to ascertain the facts as the lawyer knows them. 
Id. A comment to Rule 3.3 states that ―[t]here are circumstances where a failure to make a 
disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation,‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2009), but nowhere is there a suggested general duty to volunteer.  
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circumstances which, if it were aware of them, would almost certainly change 
its mind about the terms of the deal, or doing the deal at all.
130
 Indeed, most 
lawyers would probably understand it as their duty, both in litigation and 
transactions, to regard the mistakes and misapprehensions of the opposing side 
as opportunities, deliberately taking advantage of them whenever possible. This 
overall idea may even be thought of (erroneously, I think) as a core premise of 
the adversary system. 
In an adversary system, each party is responsible for presenting, as 
forcefully and persuasively as it can, the facts and the law in the light most 
favorable to its own interest. This responsibility need not necessarily include a 
right (much less a duty) to take advantage of other lawyers‘ mistakes. In an 
exaggerated version of the adversary system, however, deliberately taking 
advantage of others‘ mistakes or misapprehensions is not only condoned but 
may even be considered admirable—a deft way to snatch victory from the jaws 
of defeat or to protect the interests of a client whose cause is a loser on both the 
law and the actual facts.  
Consider, for example, the case of Cotto v. United States.
131
 A child‘s hand 
was severely injured when it got caught in a conveyer belt operated by an 
employee of the United States Department of Agriculture.
132
 A claim for 
compensation was filed against the government on the boy‘s behalf.133 The 
government‘s lawyers adopted a typical stance of tort defense counsel and 
resisted paying the claim.
134
 When the boy‘s lawyer resiliently failed to supply 
certain documentation demanded by the government, the case was dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
135
 In seeking to reopen the judgment 
sixteen months later, plaintiffs contended that their earlier failure to make a 
timely motion or appeal should be excused because the government had 
continued to negotiate a settlement even after the judgment was entered.
136
 
However, the court rejected this contention saying (among other things) that 
even if the government had continued to negotiate, there was no evidence 
―indicating a pattern of affirmative action on the government's part which 
would have led a reasonably prudent person to believe that the dismissal order 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See id. 
 131. 993 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 132. Id. at 276.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See id. There was some significant sentiment on the government side that the boy's 
claim should be compensated, but the posture taken by the lawyers was forthrightly defensive. 
See id. at 276, 281. 
 135. Id. at 277. It was apparently decided below, and accepted on appeal, that the missing 
documentation was necessary for ―a substantiated, completed administrative claim‖ and, 
therefore, plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedy as required before bringing 
suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 276–77. The court mentions photographs that the 
boy‘s lawyer ―would supply‖ to the Department of Agriculture and adds that he ―apparently 
believ[ed] that the photographs would satisfy DOA's curiosity anent the extent of injury. He was 
wrong.‖ Id. at 276. 
 136. Id. at 277. 
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was something other than [final].‖137 The court ridiculed the notion that the 
government ―acted in a Svengali-like manner, lulling them to sleep with 
settlement songs while the sands of time drained and the appeal period 
expired.‖138 All the government had done was stand by and allow the plaintiff‘s 
lawyer to blunder along until any possibility of justice on the merits was lost. 
The point about Cotto is not the magnitude of the lawyer‘s strategic 
mistakes,
139
 but what the opposing lawyers and the court did about them, and 
what those responses tell us about the lawyer‘s role in our exaggerated version 
of the adversary system. The first thing we see is that the people who work in 
the justice system are not responsible for dispensing substantive ―justice‖ the 
way that, for example, physicians dispense healing. Nobody in the Cotto 
process was personally responsible for seeing that both the boy and the 
government got what they substantively deserved, only that the applicable 
process rules were followed. Second, there is nothing wrong with seizing upon 
a ―windfall defense‖140 that emerges due to the opposition‘s errors or 
ineptitude. Finally, in an exaggerated version of the adversary system, no one 
would think that the government‘s lawyers should feel any shame or receive the 
contempt of their peers for taking advantage of an opponent‘s mistakes to 
deprive the mangled child of his day in court (and, most likely, substantial 
compensation). On the contrary, they won a substantively ―difficult‖ case, 
ordinarily a matter for professional pride. In our exaggerated version of the 
adversary system, the mistakes and misapprehensions of the opponent are seen 
not as dangers to justice but as legitimate opportunities to further the interests 
of one‘s own client—even including the interest in not paying damages that are 
substantively due. For a lawyer to disabuse the other side of the errors it is 
making would itself be regarded as a blunder,
141
 even though taking advantage 
of these errors might produce a legal result that is unwarranted by the actual 
facts and substance of the law.
142
  
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 278. 
 139. Mistakes, at least, in the view of the court. See id. at 281. 
 140. The term is adopted from State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof‘l and Jud. Ethics, Formal 
Op. CI–1164 (1987), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ 
ci-1164.html (defense counsel may present truthful but misleading evidence that exploits the 
complaining witness‘s confusion as to the time when the criminal act took place) [hereinafter 
Mich. Formal Opinion CI-1164].  
 141. It could also, quite possibly, be a breach of the disciplinary rules. See United States v. 
Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1309 (5th Cir. 1994); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 387 (1994); Mich. Formal Opinion CI-1164, supra note 140.  
 142. Of course, the ―substance of the law‖ may always be debatable, and honest lawyers 
should always be free to advocate for whatever substantive legal rules and policies are in their 
clients‘ best interests. That is to say, it is not dishonest for a lawyer to argue that the law on a 
given point is different from what the lawyer might personally think it is or, as an abstract 
matter, should be, as long as no dishonest use is made of the legal authorities and the arguments 
are not frivolous. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3(2) (2009). However, 
controversies about facts, including intentions of the parties, are of a different order. Unlike the 
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In short, in an exaggerated adversary system, the lawyer‘s job is to press 
client-defined interests by any means available within the bounds of the law 
and ethical rules.
143
 In such a system, the absence of a duty to volunteer may 
seem almost inseparable from the lawyer‘s core responsibility to present his or 
her own side as persuasively as possible. And this can make true ―honesty‖ 
very complicated. 
There is, however, no intrinsic reason why an adversary system must allow 
lawyers to treat others‘ mistakes as strategic opportunities. Indeed, even while 
American lawyers do not currently have a general duty to volunteer relevant 
information to adversaries,
144
 a number of cases have found such a duty in 
particular situations. The legal-ethics chestnut Spaulding v. Zimmerman
145
 is 
not, strictly speaking, one of these cases, but it is nonetheless a good place to 
begin. During settlement negotiations in an automobile negligence case, the 
defense lawyers omitted to tell the injured plaintiff that he had an aortic 
aneurysm—a sort of physiological time bomb.146 For some reason, the boy‘s 
own doctors had failed to notice this life-threatening condition.
147
 According to 
the court, defense counsel kept the discovery of the aneurysm to themselves 
―knowing . . . that plaintiff under all the circumstances would not accept‖ the 
defendant‘s settlement offer had he been aware of it.148 ―By reason of the 
failure of plaintiff‘s counsel to use available rules of discovery,‖ the plaintiff 
never properly asked the defendants if they had the relevant information.
149
 As 
a consequence, the parties proceeded to reach an agreed settlement and 
obtained approval of the court, while the plaintiff was still in the dark as to his 
true medical condition.
150
 The question in Spaulding was whether this 




The appellate court held that, under these particular circumstances, the 
lower court had the discretion (but was not obliged) to vacate the settlement.
152
 
―While no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required [defense 
counsel] to inform plaintiff or his counsel . . . or to advise the court therein,‖ 
                                                                                                                 
sources of the law, which are more or less equally accessible to all, the parties and the court 
typically have widely different abilities to get at the actual facts. Therefore, efforts to distort, 
distract from, or otherwise sideline the significance of the material facts of a matter are 
particularly pernicious to legal justice. 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28. 
 144. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. e (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97, cmt f (2000). 
 145. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
 146. Id. at 707–08. 
 147. Id. at 707. 
 148. Id. at 709. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 708. 
 151. Id. at 707. 
 152. Id. at 709. 
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their knowledge that the plaintiff was making a unilateral mistake of fact 
―opened the way for the court to later exercise its discretion in vacating the 
settlement.‖153 In other words, by not volunteering the critically material fact of 
the aneurysm, the defense lawyers created a legal vulnerability—that the 
settlement might later be declared voidable—but they did not violate any 
identified duty. 
Although the appellate court was agnostic,
154
 the lower court was quite 
definite on the lawyer‘s duty to volunteer, asserting that defense counsel had no 
duty to disclose the aneurysm during the negotiations.
155
 In saying this, 
however, the lower court made an interesting distinction: ―There is no doubt 
that during the course of the negotiations, when the parties were in an 
adversary relationship, no rule required or duty rested upon defendants or their 
representatives to disclose this knowledge.‖156 But when ―the procedure took on 
the posture of a joint application [for approval] to the court,‖ that adversary 
relationship ceased, at least with respect to ―the facts upon which the Court 
could and must approve settlement.‖157 Even then, the lower court did not seem 
prepared to go so far as to say the defense lawyers had any general obligation 
to disclose, but it did say that, as an ―officer of the Court,‖ counsel had a ―duty 
to make full disclosure to the Court‖ when applying for court approval in 
settlement proceedings involving a minor.
158
 In other words, the court felt it 
necessary to identify two special features of the case in order to justify 
imposing a ―duty‖ to disclose the crucial fact of the aneurysm. First, the 
opposing party was a minor. Second, the context was an application to the court 
and no longer merely a private negotiation between adversaries. 
The idea that lawyers have a higher duty of candor toward courts than 
toward adversaries is explicit in the Model Rules. For example, the lawyer‘s 
affirmative duty to speak up under Model Rule 4.1(b) (to non-clients other than 
courts) is much more limited than the broad duty imposed under Rule 3.3(b) to 
―take reasonable remedial measures‖ whenever the lawyer knows that any 
person, whether a client or otherwise, intends to engage or does engage in 
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to adjudication.
159
 And the obligations of 
candor to the courts apply ―even if compliance requires disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖160 whereas the obligation to 
speak to others is specifically limited by Rule 1.6.
161
 To be sure, the Model 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 710. 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 155. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709–10. 
 156. Id. at 709 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  
 159. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009). The corresponding range of the 
duty to speak under Model Rule 4.1(b) is limited to avoiding assisting the lawyer‘s own clients 
in committing crime or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). 
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2009). 
 161. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). 
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Rules obligation of candor to the courts may not always be quite as high as the 
obligation that applies in disciplinary matters and admissions to the bar,
162
 nor 
is it as high as that exacted in Spaulding,
163
 but it does occupy a decidedly 
higher position than the standards under Rule 4.1 for the benefit of other 
lawyers and the public generally. Here again we see a kind of multi-level 
hierarchy of candor in the Model Rules, with the lowest level of honesty and 
candor owed to other lawyers and the public generally while higher levels are 
applicable to bar admissions and disciplinary matters, and to the courts.
164
 
The idea that lawyer honesty means one thing in one context and something 
else in another is, perhaps, not entirely easy to accept. A case in which the court 
explicitly did not accept it is Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold 
Storage Co.
165
 The court in Virzi noted how Spaulding condoned defense 
counsel‘s omission to mention the aneurysm ―during the course of 
negotiations‖ but then recognized that ―a duty to disclose arose once the parties 
reached a settlement and sought the court‘s approval.‖166 It also cited a state bar 
ethics opinion which declared that a lawyer owes ―an affirmative duty of 
absolute candor and frankness to the court which transcends his private 
employment [by the client].‖167 From these and other sources, the court 
concluded that ―[t]here is no question that plaintiff‘s attorney owed a duty of 
candor to this Court.‖168 The court went even further, however, adding that, 
―[a]lthough it presents a more difficult judgment call, . . . the same duty of 
candor and fairness required a disclosure to opposing counsel, even though 
counsel did not ask.‖169 ―The handling of a lawsuit and its progress is not a 
game. There is an absolute duty of candor and fairness on the part of counsel to 
both the Court and opposing counsel.‖170  
The last quoted sentence is a resounding endorsement of what has to be a 
basic principle of truly honest lawyering. The problem is that it is hard to 
recognize such a principle in the practices of the American adversary system 
today. Most lawyers would almost certainly be horrified to hear that they are 
ethically subject to an ―absolute duty of candor and fairness‖ to opposing 
counsel.
171
 That would seem to mean, at the very least, that a lawyer is expected 
to tell everything that the opponents would likely want to know even if they do 
                                                                                                                 
 162. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009). 
 163. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 710. 
 164. See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. 
 165. 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
 166. Id. at 510. As discussed above, the appellate opinion in Spaulding did not explicitly 
recognize a ―duty‖ to disclose, though the lower court‘s order appeared to do so. See supra text 
accompanying note 156; see also Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709–10. 
 167. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 511 (quoting State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof‘l and Jud. 
Ethics, Formal Op. 142 (1951)). 
 168. Id. at 512.  
 169. Id. (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. (emphasis added). 
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not ask. No lies, certainly; but must lawyers volunteer information that is 
against our client‘s interests? That is not, I think, the way most lawyers believe 
they are supposed to practice law.  
For all its broad principle, however, Virzi was not, in the context of its 
facts, an especially exceptional case. The particular bit of information that the 
Virzi lawyer had failed to disclose was that his client was dead.
172
 And when it 
got to its actual holding, the Virzi court became considerably more qualified in 
its language, stating that a lawyer ―owes an affirmative duty of candor and 
frankness to the Court and to opposing counsel when such a major event as the 
death of the plaintiff has taken place.
173
 This added qualification sharply cuts 
down the generous duty of candor that the court seemed to have in mind 
elsewhere in its opinion. After all, death is a uniquely ―major‖ event—probably 
the most major event that most people personally experience. One is led to 
wonder what other events, apart from ―such a significant fact as the death of 
one‘s client,‖174 might also trigger the lawyer‘s duty to volunteer information. It 
is hardly helpful for a court to say that lawyers have ―an absolute duty of 
candor and fairness . . . to both the Court and opposing counsel‖175 if it means a 
duty that only applies in the most extraordinary of circumstances.  
There is, however, another feature of Virzi that is perhaps even more 
troubling from the standpoint of honest lawyering. While the plaintiff‘s death 
was certainly significant to the plaintiff, it did not appear to have any 
significance at all to the substantive merits of the case.
176
 The death was not 
―caused by injuries related to the lawsuit, and did not have any effect on the 
fairness of the . . . award.‖177 Apparently, the only reason the court considered 
the death of the plaintiff to be such ―essential information‖ was that the defense 
lawyer had expected the plaintiff to be such a strong witness on his own 
behalf.
178
 Thus, although the death did not weaken the plaintiff‘s case, it did 
weaken his counsel‘s ability to present that case. By keeping the death a secret, 
plaintiff‘s counsel deprived the defense of a strategic advantage—not an 
advantage that had anything to do with truth, to be sure, but one that had to do 
solely with winning. In other words, the plaintiff‘s lawyer in Virzi was 
denounced, not for failing to supply information essential to get at truth, but for 
failing to supply information that the other side could use to resist a fair 
settlement. Even though the court stated that ―[t]he handling of a lawsuit and its 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 508; see GILLERS, supra note 48, at 626 (―Courts have 
consistently upheld discipline of lawyers who [fail to reveal] the death of their clients in 
litigation.‖ (citing In re Forrest, 730 A.2d 340, 344 (N.J. 1999))). 
 173. Id. at 512 (emphasis added). 
 174. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 Reporter‘s 
Notes cmt. e (2000) (providing examples of a lawyer‘s duty to volunteer information, though 
without setting forth any particular principle to explain them). 
 175. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 511. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 512. 
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progress is not a game,‖179 it treated the withheld information in Virzi precisely 
as though a lawsuit is a game, one whose goal is not a ―just‖ result but, instead, 
one where each side vies to get the best outcome for itself. 
In sum, an exaggerated version of the adversary system can complicate 
honesty because complete candor is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
conception of the lawyer‘s duty to prevail in the client‘s cause by any means 
within the bounds of the law and ethical rules. As part and parcel of this 
conception, the lawyer‘s duty to hold back information is not necessarily 
limited to protecting or advancing some lawful interest or objective of the 
client.
180
 If the client‘s personal goal is to avoid a prison sentence that the law 
prescribes for his act, to escape the obligation of a contract he made, to avoid 
paying damages for his tort, or to get out of paying lawful child support, the 
attainment of such a goal is presumably the client‘s ―cause‖ for purposes of the 
Model Rules.
181
 And it would be the client‘s cause for most lawyers as well. 
This means not only that the lawyer has no duty to volunteer material 
information to the other side when it is obviously misinformed, but also that 
lawyers must be on the alert to seize advantage from the other side‘s blunders, 
or even to argue for interpretations of evidence or agreements that would turn 
reasonable past behavior, when viewed in retrospect, into blunders. 
IV. A LITTLE PERSPECTIVE: UNITED STATES V. ROGERS 
The question of when there is a legal duty to volunteer information is one 
that has nagged the law for many decades. The law of fraud is historically based 
on misrepresentation as opposed to mere ―non‖-representation.182 In the law of 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Id. 
 180. The Model Rules place no explicit limits on the kinds of client‘s ―interests‖ that may 
be protected or advanced by lawyer confidentiality. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 
1.6, 3.1 cmt 1 (2009). Although the Restatement says that lawyers need act only to advance the 
―lawful‖ objectives of their clients, the limitation to ―lawful‖ was not repeated when it came to 
describing the lawyer‘s duties of confidentiality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS §§ 16(1), 60(1)(a) (2000). Instead, the Restatement seems to contemplate that the 
lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality applies whenever there is a reasonable prospect that disclosure 
will ―adversely affect a material interest of the client‖—whether that interest be a lawful one or 
not. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(1)(a) (2000); see infra text 
accompanying note 184. Some examples appear in the next sentence in the text. As those 
examples should make clear, there are many circumstances in which a client may wish to escape 
or evade the behavioral norms, constraints and consequences prescribed by the substance of the 
law and, for success, would depend on the lawyer remaining discreet. 
 181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 3.1 cmt 1 (2009).  
 182. See the pre-2002 definition of ―fraud‖ in the Model Rules, which expressly 
excluded ―failure to apprise another of relevant information.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT TERMINOLOGY (2001). The classic statement of the fraud concept is from Peek v. 
Gurney, where Lord Cairns stated that: 
Mere nondisclosure of material facts, however morally censurable, . . . would in my 
opinion form no ground for an action in the nature of an action for misrepresentation. 
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contracts, a failure to inform another that he or she is making a unilateral 
mistake, though once a matter of controversy, is now fairly firmly established, 
at least as a basis for rescission.
183
 Of course, even where there is no legal duty 
to speak up, silence may be widely considered to be less than completely 
honest.
184
 Let us assume, however, that when the law regards tricky behavior as 
too reprehensible to allow, there is at least a presumption that the behavior is 
dishonest. 
To supply some perspective, consider the court‘s reasoning in United States 
v. Rogers,
 
a case in which the wrongdoer was not a lawyer.
185
 The defendant in 
Rogers went to a bank with a check and told the teller he wanted to deposit part 
of it and receive the balance in cash.
186
 The total amount of the check was 
$97.92, and he asked to deposit $80.
187
 However, the teller misread the check 
and placed $1126.59 on the counter, including two strapped packages of 
banknotes containing $500 each.
188
 The defendant picked up the $1126.59 and 
departed.
189
 He was later convicted of bank robbery.
190
 On appeal, the court 
held that the ―proof did support the conviction.‖191  
                                                                                                                 
There must, in my opinion, be some active misstatement of fact, or, at all events, such a 
partial and fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding of that which is not stated 
makes that which is stated absolutely false.  
Peek v. Gurney, (1873) 6 L.R.E. & I. App. 377, 403; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 161 & cmt. a (1981) (listing the ―special situations‖ in which non-disclosure 
can be treated as equivalent to a misrepresentation); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 737–38 (5th ed. 1984). 
 183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1981). 
 184. ―A buyer of property, for example, is not ordinarily [legally] expected to disclose 
circumstances that make the property more valuable than the seller supposes.‖ RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. a, 161 cmt. d (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d  illus. 10 (1981) (giving as an illustration a land buyer who enters into 
the contract without telling the seller that the land contains valuable mineral deposits, according 
to a government survey). In a similar vein, the Second Restatement of Torts would appear to 
allow persons to take knowing advantage of the ―indolent, inexperienced or ignorant‖ or of 
persons whose ―judgment is bad, or [who do] not have access to adequate information.‖ 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k & illus. 6–8 (1977). The persons who take 
advantage of others in such situations may have contract rights that are legally safe from 
rescission, but how many people would knowingly trust such persons, or regard their sharp 
dealing as ―honest‖? 
 185. 289 F.2d 433, 434 (4th Cir. 1961). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 433–34. 
 191. Id. at 434. The conviction was, however, reversed and the case remanded because of 
an error in the charge to the jury:  
The District Court went too far . . . when it told the jury it might convict if, though his 
initial receipt of the overpayment was innocent, the defendant thereafter formed the 
intention to, and did, convert the overpayment. . . .  [C]ases in the United States and in 
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What the defendant did in the Rogers case was, to put it bluntly, knowingly 
take advantage of another person‘s mistake. The defendant did not ―cause‖ the 
blunder; he did not say or do anything to distract the bank teller. He did nothing 
to lead her astray or otherwise induce her to err.
192
 He simply saw that she was 
making a material mistake, realized that the mistake was to his advantage, and 
then silently availed himself of it. For that, he was guilty of a serious crime. 
The pivotal legal question in Rogers was whether the defendant‘s acts 
would have constituted common-law larceny—the ―felonious taking and 
carrying away [of] the personal goods [o]f another.‖193 This question was 
pivotal because, under the relevant subsection of the ―bank robbery act,‖ the 
defendant would be guilty only if his actions would have constituted larceny 
―as that crime has been defined by the common law.‖194 The court held that the 
defendant‘s actions did amount to common-law larceny.195  
Now a key point about common-law larceny for present purposes is that it 
does not include ―obtaining goods by false pretense.‖196 In other words, the 
basis of the defendant‘s guilt was not that he had obtained the money by an 
affirmative misrepresentation of any kind. Rather, it sufficed for guilt that the 
defendant silently took advantage of another‘s blunder, which he did nothing to 
induce. As the court explained: 
It has long been recognized, however, that when the transferor acts under a 
unilateral mistake of fact, his delivery of a chattel may be ineffective to 
transfer title or his right to possession. If the transferee, knowing of the 
transferor's mistake, receives the goods with the intention of appropriating 
                                                                                                                 
England . . . have consistently held that, if there is a mutual mistake and the recipient is 
innocent of wrongful purpose at the time of his initial receipt of the overpayment, its 
subsequent conversion by him cannot be larceny. 
Id. at 439 (footnotes omitted).  
 192. At any rate, the court did not think it legally important to mention such additional 
facts, if they existed. See id. at 434. They were not necessary for conviction or for the ―larceny‖ 
theory of the case to apply. Id. at 438. 
 193. Id. at 438 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Note that the defendant‘s crime did not constitute ―robbery‖ in the conventional 
sense because the applicable statutory definition did not require that. Id. at 437. See 2 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.11, at 438, 445–51 (1986) 
(unlawful taking of property by force or intimidation). The essence of the crime was that the 
defendant commited larceny. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437. 
 194. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437.  
 195. Id. at 438. The court remanded the case for retrial with proper jury instructions, but 
noted that the evidence presented ―proved the commission of [larceny].‖ Id. at 437–39. 
 196. Id. at 437. The essence of larceny in the common-law conception is that the ―taking 
must be trespassory,‖ that is ―an invasion of the other‘s right to possession.‖ Id. at 438 
(emphasis added). If victims are duped by false pretenses into transferring their property 
voluntarily, then there is no ―invasion.‖ See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 193, §8.1–2, at 327–
32, 339–40, 342–43. 
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Most non-lawyers would have no difficulty seeing that what Rogers did 
was wrong—essentially stealing. To obtain another‘s property by knowingly 
exploiting another‘s mistake is larceny even if198 the person taking advantage 
did nothing to cause or contribute to the mistake.
199
 For lawyers, however, it is 
a different matter. Lawyers treat the mistakes of others as opportunities, and 
seizing on those opportunities is one of the things that lawyers do. It is what 
lawyers call ―no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant 
facts.‖200 
The legal process offers numerous technical opportunities to obtain others‘ 
property when there is no substantive right to do so. Broadly speaking, such 
―robbery under the forms of law‖201 might consist of any effort at shrewdly 
gaming the legal process in order to obtain a judgment for money or other 
property from a person who has done no wrong. It is not, of course, robbery in 
the conventional, technical sense, nor even in the broader sense defined in the 
statute applied in United States v. Rogers.
202
 Persons are not arrested for 
committing ―robbery . . . under the forms of law.‖203 They do not serve time. 
However, when people enlist the power of government to force innocent others 
to part with their property against their will, it would seem at the very least to 
be the moral analogue, if not the moral equivalent, of robbery in the more 
conventional mode.  
Partially, these opportunities to make plays on the legal system and get 
something not substantively deserved come about because of the inevitable 
imperfections in any institution designed and operated by human beings.
204
 
Partially, they are inherent in the necessary complexities of the substantive rules 
and the system that exists to carry them out. Perhaps most of all, however, these 
opportunities exist for a reason that is neither inevitable nor necessary, namely 
that we largely embrace an exaggerated version of the adversary system, a 
version in which no one is personally responsible for getting at the truth and no 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 438. 
 198. Indeed, technically, ―only‖ if. See supra text accompanying note 196. 
 199. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437–38. 
 200. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt 1 (2009). 
 201. The phrase is borrowed from Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874), where it 
was used in reference to a tax. The usage here is from the prevailing argument in a later case, 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 397 (1922), where the phrase was employed to 
describe the effect of legislation that cut down private property rights.  
 202. Id. 
 203. Loan Ass’n, 87 U.S. at 664. 
 204. ―All human institutions are imperfect—courts as well as commissions and 
legislatures.‖ Chicago, Milwauke & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 465 (1890). ―In 
consequence of the imperfection incident to all that is human, wrong may sometimes prevail in 
the purest and wisest judicial tribunals . . . .‖ Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Doe Law Firm, 668 So.2d 
534, 538 (Ala. 1995). 
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one is expected to volunteer to correct the misimpressions or mistakes of others. 
On the contrary, silently standing by and seizing advantage from others‘ 
obvious unilateral mistakes is practically endorsed, a seemingly inherent feature 
of the lawyer‘s duty of ―zeal in advocacy‖205 and ethical obligation ―to use legal 
procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖ within the limits of ―[t]he 
law, both procedural and substantive.‖206 
The opportunity to get other people‘s property away from them, and to do it 
legally, is obviously likely to have its attractions, and those who are so inclined 
may seek the assistance of lawyers to aid them in their pursuit of such 
―interests.‖ According to the Model Rules, a lawyer is not required to assist a 
client with such a ―cause,‖207 but the lawyer is permitted to do so.208 
Specifically, the rules state that ―a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation,‖209 and the comments note 
(seemingly with approval) that ―lawyers usually defer to the client regarding 
such questions as the . . . concern for third person who might be adversely 
affected.‖210  
For many years I have taught from first-year property casebooks that have 
consisted mostly of cases in which somebody was trying to get somebody else‘s 
property using the processes of the law. In a significant proportion of these 
cases, the basis for the claim was some mistake that had been made somewhere 
along the line (as opposed to, say, some wrong or breach of duty on the part of 
the defendant). To the naïve eye of a person not inured to the lawyer‘s view of 
honesty, these cases might seem like little more than a string of attempts to 
exploit legal technicalities or assert unforeseen interpretations in order take 
away other people‘s property rights. 
As is usual among property professors (it is my guess), I have treated these 
standard casebook cases mostly as plain vanilla presentations of property law 
problems and of the reasoning that lawyers and courts typically use to resolve 
them. I thought nothing of formulating ―Socratic‖ questions that roughly boiled 
down to: ―Suppose you represented the plaintiff in this case—what legal 
arguments would you make to persuade the court to take the property away 
from the defendant and give it to your client?‖ 
                                                                                                                 
 205. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009). 
 206. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, cmt. 1 (2009). 
 207. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2009); see MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009). 
 208. As long as the lawyer stays within the bounds of the procedural and substantive law 
and ethical rules: ―[t]he law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within 
which an advocate may proceed.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009). I 
take this to mean that a lawyer is permitted to invoke legitimate procedural and evidentiary rules 
in an effort to defeat a claim that has substantive merit. See supra notes 3 & 17. 
 209. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009). Otherwise the lawyer should bow 
out. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2009) (allowing the lawyer to withdraw if 
he or she finds the client‘s intentions ―repugnant‖) 
 210. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009). 
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A rich and interesting case that has appeared recently in casebooks is 
Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., a contest over a valuable 
building in upper Manhattan.
211
 The Symphony Space case does not merely 
have an outcome that is a bit stunning in its own right, but it is a very useful 
teaching case because of the several hypothetical variations that spawn readily 
off of it. 
IV. SYMPHONY SPACE, INC. V. PERGOLA PROPERTIES, INC. 
The case arose out of a moderately complex real estate transaction that was 
essentially donative in character.
212
 In 1978, a representative of Symphony 
Space, Inc. approached a Manhattan real estate investor and expressed interest 
in using a theater located in one of the investor‘s buildings.213 Symphony Space 
was a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to the performing arts.
214
 The 
building in question consisted of approximately 58% theater space; the 
remainder was described as commercial space.
215
 The investor‘s business goal 
had been to hold this and several adjacent buildings with a view to selling them 
later, after property values in the area increased and the existing commercial 
leases had expired.
216
 Meanwhile, of course, the investor would have to pay the 
real estate taxes assessed against the buildings.
217
 However, as an eligible not-
for-profit corporation, Symphony Space was legally entitled to an exemption 
from property taxes for the portion of the building that it used.
218
 Hence, the 
plan: The parties agreed that the investor would essentially donate the use of 
the theater to Symphony Space.
219
 As a result, Symphony Space would get a 
venue for its performances and other needs at practically no cost, while the 
investor would no longer have to pay $30,000 per year of property taxes on the 
theater facilities it was donating.
220
  
                                                                                                                 
 211. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 800 (N.Y. 1996). 
 212. Id. at 800–01. 
 213. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (App. Div. 
1995). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800. 
 216. Id. at 801. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (N.Y. 1983); see also 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(2) (McKinney Supp. 2009). The Court of Appeals opinion 
stated that Symphony Space would receive a tax exemption on the ―entire building,‖ not just the 
theater portion. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 801. This would appear, however, to be 
contrary to the applicable statute. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(2) (McKinney Supp. 
2009). Indeed, in an earlier opinion, the Court of Appeals had made it clear that Symphony 
Space had ―not requested tax-exempt status for the remaining part of the property which is used 
by a tenant and subtenants for a variety of commercial purposes.‖ Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d at 
1095 n.1. 
 219. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800–01.  
 220. Id. at 801. 
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In order to ensure Symphony Space received the tax exemption to which it 
was entitled, the parties structured the donation so that the not-for-profit would 
hold the legal title to both the exempt and non-exempt portions of the 
building.
221
 Accordingly, the donor-investor transferred legal ownership of the 
theater building to Symphony Space for an essentially nominal price, about 
$10,000.
222
 Of this price, only $10 was paid initially, and the remaining 
$10,000 was spread out over twenty-five years, secured by a purchase-money 
mortgage.
223
 Meanwhile, the donor-investor was required to make the payments 
on its own mortgage,
224
 which covered the actual cost of acquiring the space. 
As part of the same deal, Symphony Space leased the non-theater portions of 
the building back to the donor for $1 per year.
225
 The upshot of this 
arrangement was to give Symphony Space ―virtually cost free‖226 access to the 




In order to provide for the time when the arrangement was to unwind, the 
parties made an agreement under which the donor was supposed to have the 
right to buy the building back at certain times and on the occurrence of certain 
events.
228
 The buy-back prices under this agreement were roughly equivalent to 
the original (nominal) purchase price plus an inflationary increment.
229
 The 
manifest reason for this buy-back agreement was, of course, that it allowed the 
donor-investor to get its building back. After all, the donor-investor only 
intended to make a ―loan‖ of the theater space, not to give away the whole 
building for all time. Everybody involved in the transaction must have 
understood that. Otherwise, the buy-back agreement would have made no 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2009); Symphony 
Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800–01. Apparently, without this arrangement, the use of the theater 
would have cost Symphony Space (or somebody) $30,000 per year in real estate taxes—which, 
as a matter of state policy, a not-for-profit like Symphony Space should not have to bear. Cf. 
Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d at 1096. 
 222. See Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800 ($10,010, for a substantial theater plus office 
space on upper Broadway in Manhattan).  
 223. Id. at 801. 
 224. Id. (in the amount of $243,000). 
 225. Id. at 800–01. 
 226. Symphony Space, Inc v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 136, 141 (App. Div. 
1995). 
 227. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 801. Although Symphony Space presumably had to 
pay its own operating costs, such as heat and utilities, the donor retained ―certain maintenance 
obligations.‖ Id.  
 228. Id. Essentially, the events consisted of defaults by Symphony Space, either by failing 
to make its (relatively small) required payments or failing to allow the investor to retain 
possession of the commercial portions of the building. Id. In addition, the donor could opt to 
buy back ―at any time . . . during any of the calendar years 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003.‖ Id.  
 229. The price would rise to a maximum of $28,000 after 25 years. Id. at 800–01. Because 
payment of all but $10 of the purchase price was deferred, Symphony Space acquired the use of 
the theater space for essentially no out-of-pocket purchase price whatever. Id.  
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sense. Years later, however, litigation Symphony Space challenged the validity 
of this crucial buy-back agreement,
230
 and Symphony Space won.
231
  
Saying the case presented a ―novel question,‖232 the Court of Appeals held 
that the buy-back agreement was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
233
 
The novel question was whether New York‘s Rule Against Perpetuities applies 
to commercial options, which is what the buy-back agreement created.
234
 The 
court held that it does.
235
 As a result, the whole building became the permanent 
property of Symphony Space, causing its erstwhile owner to suffer a financial 
loss of over $20 million.
236
 In short, by skillful advocacy, the lawyers for 
Symphony Space succeeded in scoring a $20 million property interest from an 
innocent owner by persuading the court to nullify their client‘s side of a two-
way deal.  
Now if this were simply a case of an illegal contract, as the Court of 
Appeals implied that it was,
237
 there may have been little cause for concern. 
However, the case was not so simple. For even given the court‘s conclusion on 
the purely legal issues, it certainly did not follow that it had to defeat the donor-




                                                                                                                 
 230. Id. at 802. 
 231. Id. Symphony Space prevailed in the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, a 
decision that the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 802. 
 232. Id. at 800. 
 233. Id.; see also N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS, AND TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 2002) 
(―No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years 
after one or more lives in being at the creation of the estate and any period of gestation 
involved.‖).  
 234. ―This case presents the novel question whether options to purchase commercial 
property are exempt from the prohibition against remote vesting embodied in New York‘s Rule 
Against Perpetuities.‖ Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800.  
 235. Id. (―[A]n exception for commercial options finds no support in our law.‖). 
 236. See id. at 801–02. There had, in the meantime, been a succession in investors when, in 
1981, the original donor sold its interest in the properties to the nominee of Pergola Properties. 
Id. at 802. Presumably, however, that purchase price appropriately reflected the arrangement for 
donation of use. For one thing, Pergola would have assumed that it was acquiring a valid option 
to terminate the space-donation arrangement on the agreed terms. Another feature of the 
donative arrangement that would have affected the price was that, by providing exemption from 
the property taxes, the donative arrangement presumably tended to increase the sale value of the 
building (and price to Pergola) by eliminating a substantial cost while sacrificing only a 
difficult-to-lease asset, namely, the space configured as a theater. See id. at 800–02.  
 237. Id. at 809. 
 238. To be sure, an unremitting Legal Realist might contend that no one could say the 
property had ever ―really‖ been the defendant‘s until a court had finally so decided. This is not, 
of course, the way most people think about property rights—that all ownership is indeterminate 
until adjudicated at law. At any rate, at the time the donation was originally structured, the 
plaintiff would almost certainly have agreed that the donor‘s interests under the agreement 
amounted to a kind of de facto ―ownership‖ with very substantial value. Indeed, to say the 
plaintiff did not view the donor as de facto owner under the original deal would be tantamount 
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The argument for Symphony Space had two critical links: First, the 
interpretive question of what the parties intended, and, second, the ―novel‖ 
legal question of whether New York‘s Rule Against Perpetuities applies to 
options in commercial transactions.
239
 Although the court‘s opinion focused 
mainly on the novel legal question, that legal question could only come into 
play after giving a particular interpretation to the buy-back agreement—an 
interpretation that was not necessarily required by its language. In other words, 
in order to win, the lawyers for Symphony Space not only needed to 
successfully raise a novel question of law, but they also needed to persuade the 
court to interpret the agreement in a certain particular way—a way that would 
render the agreement void. For even using the rule of substantive law that the 
court chose to adopt in answer to the ―novel‖ legal question, the court still 
could have reached exactly the opposite ultimate conclusion by interpreting the 
agreement differently, thus preserving the rights of the investor. To see this, we 
must take a slightly closer look at the buy-back agreement.  
As stated earlier, the agreement provided that the investor would be entitled 
to buy the building back for an essentially nominal sum at certain times and on 
certain events.
240
 What concerned the Court of Appeals and implicated the Rule 
Against Perpetuities was the provision empowering the investor to make an 
―election‖ to buy the building back ―at any time‖ during the years 1987, 1993, 
1998, and 2003.
241
 The problem was the last of these four buy-back years, 
2003. The last buy-back year was more than twenty-one years following the 
creation of the option,
242
 and this possibility of a post-1999 buy-back is what 
implicated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
243
  
Under the particular facts of this case, said the court, ―the perpetuities 
period is simply 21 years.‖244 Therefore, the agreement‘s inclusion of the 2003 
buy-back year had placed the property under a ―Sword of Damocles‖245 for 
                                                                                                                 
to saying that the plaintiff knowingly entrapped the donor in an elaborate con game—pretending 
to borrow when, in fact, they meant to keep. 
 239. See Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800, 809. 
 240. Id. at 801.  
 241. Id. An analogous problem was presented by the fact that the agreement also provided 
buy-back rights for certain contingencies that might occur more than twenty-one years after the 
agreement was made (e.g., default on the mortgage). Id. at 807. These contingent buy-back 
rights, exercisable after twenty-one years, would have been just as invalid as the 2003 buy-back. 
Therefore, with respect to them the same crucial interpretive question arises, namely whether 
these contingent buy-back rights should be interpreted to be separate options or integral parts of 
the same option as the buy-backs that were agreed upon for the years 1987, 1993, and 1998 
(which fell within the twenty-one-year perpetuities period). See id. at 807–08. 
 242. Id. at 801, 806. The option was created in December 1978. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 806. Because the parties to the transaction were corporations, the usual 
complicating factor of the Rule Against Perpetuities—so-called ―measuring lives‖—was absent, 
leaving only the basic twenty-one-year period as controlling. Id. 
 245. Id. at 805. 
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nearly four years too long.
246
 Accordingly, said the court, ―the option agreement 
is invalid.‖247 
While the court‘s resolution of the ―novel‖ perpetuities question may have 
been itself a bit of a surprise,
248
 it did not dispose of the case. In order to say 
that the whole buy-back arrangement was invalid under the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the court first had to interpret the parties‘ agreement as creating 
only one single option (with several exercise dates and events) rather than a 
number of separate options. This was the critical interpretive question in the 
case. For if the agreement were interpreted to provide for a number of separate 
options, instead of one single option, then only those options exercisable after 
twenty-one years would necessarily be void under the Rule. The others, 
including the still extant option for 1998, would still be perfectly valid.
249
  
The Court of Appeals pointed to nothing in the parties‘ agreement that 
compelled the conclusion that it created only one unitary (and, thus, totally 
void) option. For all that appears in its opinion, the Court of Appeals could just 
as easily have interpreted the relevant subsection of the buy-back agreement
250
 
as creating four separate options. The first three of these would have been valid 
(being exercisable within the twenty-one years) and only the last one not. 
However, the interpretation selected by the Court of Appeals was to treat all the 
various buy-back rights as one single option, not as a number of separate ones. 
It read the parties‘ agreement as creating a single option, which it then promptly 
declared to be unenforceable.
251
 Faced with language that offered at least two 
possible interpretations, the Court of Appeals picked the interpretation that 
made the buy-back void.  
                                                                                                                 
 246. Id. at 808. 
 247. Id.  
 248. At the time that the buy-back agreement was made, the relevant statutory language 
was relatively new and not at all explicit on the question of commercial options. See id. at 803. 
At that time, moreover, the cases on which the Court of Appeals relied as interpretive 
precedents had not yet been decided. See id. at 803–04 (citing Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 595 
N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1992); Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y. 
1986); Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1982), aff’d 447 N.E.2d 
76 (N.Y. 1983)). Prior to 1965, the New York Rule Against Perpetuities clearly did not apply to 
commercial options. See Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461. The change was effected 
(albeit implicitly) by the Legislature‘s adoption, in 1965, of former Real Property Law section 
43 (now N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 9–1.1(b) (McKinney 2002)). See Buffalo 
Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462. 
 249. The case was decided in 1996 and, therefore, under this interpretation the investor 
would have had sufficient time to exercise the 1998 option and avoid the expropriation. See 
Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 799. 
 250. See id. at 801. ―Section 3 of that agreement provides that Broadwest may exercise its 
option to purchase the property during any of the following ‗Exercise Periods‘: ‗(a) at any time 
after July 1, 1979, so long as the Notice of Election specifies that the Closing is to occur during 
any of the calendar years 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 . . . .‘‖ Id. 
 251. See id. at 808. 
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V. REFLECTIONS ON SYMPHONY SPACE 
In teaching the ethical dimensions of Symphony Space v. Pergola, the first 
thing I stress is that, from all that appears, the lawyers for Symphony Space did 
exactly what most lawyers today think lawyers are supposed to do—indeed, 
what the current ethical rules seem to require.
252
 A client came to them because 
it was faced with losing a valuable performance space, essential to its mission. 
The lawyers‘ job was to protect their client‘s interests, and they set about doing 
everything reasonably possible within the legal and ethical boundaries to save 
their client‘s possession.253 From the court‘s opinion it is obvious that the 
lawyers for Symphony Space argued diligently for the most favorable 
interpretation of the existing legal authorities and operative agreements.
254
 This 
is what lawyers do.  
Still, the victory in Symphony Space must have felt particularly sweet. The 
main goal of the not-for-profit was to save its use of the concert hall.
255
 But by 
an impressive advocacy effort, the lawyers managed not merely to preserve the 
right to use the hall but to turn things around to the point where Symphony 
Space ended up being declared the outright owner of the whole building.
256
 
What dedicated advocate, steadfastly loyal to the client‘s best interests, would 
not be justly proud of such an outcome?  
Yet, there are nagging doubts. Was the case a spectacular victory of justice 
over the forces of injustice, or was it, perhaps, something else? The lawyers for 
Symphony Space were surely very clever to present the case as a ―novel 
question‖ under New York perpetuities law and to persuade the court to 
interpret the parties‘ agreement in a way that would make it void. But, is this 
the sort of cleverness that redounds to the credit of the legal profession? By 
asserting what might easily be regarded as a legal ―technicality,‖257 the lawyers 
for Symphony Space won the case, but does that mean the not-for-profit really 
was legally entitled to the building in the first place before the case ever came 
to court? In other words, did the court merely declare what was already legally 
true, that the not-for-profit unqualifiedly owned the building all along? Or is 
this a case in which a court was persuaded, in essence, to take property away 
from one person and give it to another?  
                                                                                                                 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 121–81. Being in New York, the lawyers in this 
case were subject to the New York code, based on the American Bar Association‘s Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility, rather than the Model Rules. In relevant respects, however, the 
two share the same general vision of the adversary system and the lawyer‘s role in it. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 121–81. 
 254. It does not appear that, in this particular case, the facts were heavily contested but, of 
course, in many cases the outcome essentially turns on the ―facts,‖ i.e., the inferences that are 
drawn from the raw evidence. 
 255. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 802. 
 256. See id. at 809. 
 257. And the Rule Against Perpetuities is surely a technicality. 
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In raising these questions in class, and considering what they might imply 
about lawyer ethics, I find it useful to try to fill in the space that lies between 
Symphony Space and Rogers, the ―bank robbery‖ case described earlier.258 
Obviously, the two cases are different. First, there is every reason to believe 
that when the Symphony Space buy-back agreement was originally negotiated, 
everybody was acting with the utmost good faith and neither side was looking 
for an opportunity to pounce on the other‘s blunder. The mistake (if it can be 
called such) was surely a mutual one, with both parties acting in the belief that 
the transaction they were structuring would be legally valid and enforceable 
according to their understanding.
259
  
There is also another distinction between the two cases. The Symphony 
Space case does not present us with a lawyer quietly taking advantage of 
another person‘s blunder, as did the defendant in Rogers. Rather, it was a case 
of lawyers actively trying to convert another‘s prior choices into blunders, so to 
speak, by advocating for conclusions of law and an interpretation of an 
agreement that would make the buy-back arrangements something that neither 
party originally intended them to be, namely, empty verbiage. This strategy for 
getting another‘s property is clearly not fraud (purposefully inducing another‘s 
blunder), nor is it the sort of wrong that was condemned in Rogers. It lies 
elsewhere on the continuum.  
To see the continuum more clearly, and some of the stopping points that lie 
along it, let us consider several spin-off hypotheticals from Symphony Space. In 
each of these hypothetical cases, it is assumed that the parties have worked out 
a tentative agreement similar to the one in the actual case, except that the 
tentative agreement provides for only three exercise years: 1987, 1993, and 
1998—omitting the fatal exercise year 2003. It is assumed, as well, that it was 
already a settled (albeit somewhat obscure) point of law that the local Rule 
Against Perpetuities would apply to commercial options.
260
 At this point in the 
negotiations, the several spin-off hypotheticals diverge: 
A. Hypothetical 1—Inducing Blunder 
Suppose that the lawyers for the not-for-profit proposed inserting 2003 as 
an additional buy-back year knowing that 2003 would exceed the perpetuities 
period and give their client a solid legal basis for later invalidating the entire 
buy-back agreement. They made this proposal in the hope that the other side 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See supra text accompanying notes 182–211. 
 259. In Rogers, the Fourth Circuit made clear that it would not be larceny if the defendant‘s 
―initial receipt of the overpayment was innocent, [and] the defendant thereafter formed the 
intention to, and did, convert the overpayment.‖ United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 439 (4th 
Cir. 1961).  
 260. As previously noted, in the actual case the relevant law consisted of legislation whose 
application to options was not at all settled at the time the parties made their agreement, and the 
previous law in New York would have clearly not applied to commercial options. See supra 
note 248. 
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would not notice the perpetuities problem and with the intention of eventually 
trying to wrest the whole building from the investor.
261
 
Some students insist that this strategy is perfectly within the ethical bounds 
of ―adversary‖ transactional practice. Maybe they are right. Isn‘t it the job of 
each lawyer to know the law and to detect such risks to his or her own client? 
After all, in the adversary system we are not our brother‘s keepers. My own 
conclusion is, however, that deliberately slipping a poison pill into an 
agreement with a view to facilitating a later escape from its burdens is 
tantamount to fraud. It is exactly the sort of submarine attack or subterranean 
tactic that earns the epithet ―shark‖ or ―rat.‖ It is not, at any rate, ―truly honest.‖ 
B. Hypothetical 2—Quietly Taking Advantage 
Now suppose that the lawyers for the donor-investor proposed adding 2003 
as a buy-back year, oblivious to the fact that that this would exceed the 
perpetuities period and could invalidate the entire buy-back agreement. The 
not-for-profit‘s lawyers saw the perpetuities issue but they decided that, 
because their client might later want to go for the whole building, they will say 
nothing.  
This hypothetical is, in my opinion, essentially analogous to Rogers 
(certainly so if the not-for-profit in fact later made an effort to expropriate the 
whole building). Of course, students who side with the lawyer‘s behavior in the 
first hypothetical have no trouble siding with what the lawyer does in this one. 
Others are drawn to agree with them, but on the theory that lawyers have no 
duty to volunteer—―no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant 
facts.‖262 However, it would be my conclusion (partially on the strength of 
Rogers) that this sort of game is ethically questionable. If silently taking the 
fruits of another‘s blunder can be larceny, I doubt that it can be considered 
―truly honest,‖ as well. 
C. Hypothetical 3—Turning Another’s Trust into a Blunder 
Let‘s go back and suppose again that the lawyers for the not-for-profit 
proposed adding 2003 as a buy-back year. However, this time both they and the 
lawyers for the donor-investor were oblivious to the risk that adding this 
exercise year could jeopardize the validity of the entire buy-back agreement. 
The lawyers for the investor accepted the proposal, trusting that it has not been 
offered as a trap. Later, in an effort to seize the whole building, the not-for-
profit‘s lawyers urge the unexpected interpretation that the buy-back agreement 
calls for one single (and, therefore, void) option rather than a number of 
separate ones. 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Perhaps these hypothetical lawyers harbored the realistic hope that real estate 
practitioners have only a vague mastery of the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is primarily a 
trusts-and-estates rule. 
 262. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009). 
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Here, similarly to the actual case, no ethical cloud would lie merely for 
unconsciously receiving the advantage. So, the question concerns solely the 
propriety of pressing the advantage. This hypothetical bears earmarks of a host 
of real life situations in which people make deals, later change their minds, and 
then ask their lawyers to pore through the agreement to find some clause or 
interpretation of the agreement that will ―get me out of this thing.‖ An ordinary 
commercial buyer who wants to get out of a contract with a seller is an 
example, though the buyer who wants to keep the goods but not pay for them 
may be a bit closer to the facts of Symphony Space.  
D. Hypothetical 4—Turning Another’s Reasonable Actions into 
 Blunders 
Suppose finally that the lawyers for the donor-investor proposed adding 
2003 as a buy-back year. Both they and the lawyers for the not-for-profit were 
oblivious to the risk that adding this exercise year could jeopardize the validity 
of the entire buy-back agreement. Later, in an effort to seize the whole building, 
the not-for-profit‘s lawyers urge the unexpected interpretation that the buy-back 
agreement calls for one single (and, therefore, void) option rather than a 
number of separate ones.
263
 
Here again, it is not the unconscious receipt of the advantage but the 
conscious decision to press it that raises possible concerns. But perhaps the 
ethical concern is justly less than in the preceding hypothetical. After all, in this 
example it was the investor who suggested the fatal provision in the first place 
and, in both the adversary model and our moral intuitions, people ought to have 
some responsibility for what they do, particularly for the results that they 
initiate. At any rate, I think that many in the profession today would say that a 
lawyer most definitely ought to seek out and take advantage of such openings 
inadvertently left by the other side, pursuing them ―for the fullest benefit of the 
client‘s cause‖ within the limits of ―[t]he law, both procedural and 
substantive.‖264 But would a truly honest lawyer do so? 
                                                                                                                 
 263. The main differences between the last two hypotheticals and Symphony Space are that, 
in Symphony Space (1) we do not know who initially proposed the 2003 buy-back year, and (2) 
the relevant law was not merely unknown to the parties but unknowable, since the issue had not 
yet been settled at the time of contracting. See supra note 248. See generally Symphony Space, 
669 N.E.2d 799. In other words, the parties‘ mistake was not as to the existing state of the law 
but as to the future state of the law.  
 264. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, cmt. 1 (2009). At the very least, before 
depriving the client of this juicy windfall opportunity, the Model Rules would seem to require 
that the lawyer communicate and consult with the client, and presumably abide by the client‘s 
decision on how to proceed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmts. 1–2, 1.4 
(2009). 
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VI. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA?— SHOULD WE LET THE AGREEMENT 
 STAND? 
People write down their agreements in order to achieve an added measure 
of security and predictability. Imperfections and ―room for interpretation‖ in 
written agreements are rather like money left lying on the dining room table 
when guests are in the house. Unfortunately, however, unlike money left on the 
table, residual wiggle room in written agreements is virtually unavoidable. 
Therefore, imaginative and unexpected interpretations offer a fertile source of 
escape for those who regret their contracts. Making such a play on linguistic 
vagaries does not require the lawyer to engage in any of the false statements, 
misrepresentations, or ―deceit‖ that the Model Rules prohibit.265 Indeed, the 
Model Rules may even call for such plays on language as a part of diligent 
representation.
266
 In our exaggerated version of the adversary system, the ―first 
great duty of an advocate [is] to reckon everything subordinate to the interests 
of his client.‖267 Of course, it is not necessary to question every unexpected or 
seemingly imaginative interpretation. Truly honest people can have honest 
disagreements. Yet, one has to be troubled when people make deals where the 
intentions are clear, and later are able to find lawyers willing to target language 
with unforeseen interpretations to get them out of those deals. If the cases like 
these have any impact on the reputation of lawyers, it is because they make 
honest people feel like prey. 
Notice that the question here most emphatically is not concerned with the 
lawyer who might find himself caught between what the law permits and what 
the lawyer considers to be morally right. A deviation between the law and the 
lawyer‘s morality can present a real conundrum.268 But much more common 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 8.4(c) (2009). 
 266. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009). 
 267. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Lord Henry 
Brougham, with evident disapproval) (alteration in original). The court seemed more attracted to 
the riposte of Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn who responded, ―to loud cheers from the 
distinguished assembly‖:  
[t]he arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin. He 
ought to uphold the interests of his clients per fas, not per nefas. He ought to know how to 
reconcile the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of truth and justice. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 268. See generally Jane B. Baron & Richard K Greenstein, Constructing the Field of 
Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 37 (2001) (describing 
how the construction of legal ethics curriculum in law schools can promote a separation 
between legal ethics and moral reasoning); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer be a Bad 
Person?, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 131 (1999) (noting that the institutional role of 
lawyers often requires them to place their clients‘ interests above that of others, rather than 
simply exercise moral reasoning); David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 873 (1999) (exploring the choice between law-centered and morality-centered theory in 
deciding what is the best approach to legal ethics); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005) (using memoranda on torture in 
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(and less discussed) is the conundrum presented by the everyday deviation that 
lawyers find between what the law intends and what the client wants. The 
person who commits a tort does not want to lose his home or assets to pay 
damages. The heir who is cut out of a will does not want to settle for merely a 
token legacy. The promisor who finds a contract burdensome does not want to 
compensate the other party for nonperformance. And so it goes for an infinitude 
of everyday legal ―problems‖ that arise when people do things but do not wish 
to endure the consequences that the law prescribes. But is it the role of honest 
lawyers to hold themselves out as being there to ―solve‖ these problems by 
helping people escape the consequences and limitations that the substance of 
the law means to impose? 
The potential for deviation between what the legal system can be led to 
permit and what the substantive law affirms as ―justice‖ is a focal point of 
much legal representation. By carefully working the evidence, inventively 
interpreting documents, and making clever use of the procedural possibilities, 
smart lawyers can help their clients avoid what the law intends for them. That is 
to say, the intricacies, inertias, and costs of the legal process lead to 
imperfections of operation, and skillful advocates can make deliberate plays on 




Quite possibly, most lawyers today would accept without qualm that it is 
perfectly all right to press for interpretations of agreements that are in their 
clients‘ current interests, even if different from their clients‘ original intentions. 
Nevertheless, there is something in that view that seems to be counter to the 
very concept of ―agreement,‖ and marks an important difference between a 
―truly honest‖ lawyer and a merely ―ethical‖ one (in the Model Rules sense). 
The truly honest lawyer would never urge an interpretation of a contract with 
the deliberate objective of frustrating the agreed exchange that both parties 
manifestly had in mind. 
Sometimes, of course, it will not be at all obvious exactly what the parties 
had in mind. As noted earlier, even the truly honest can have honest 
disagreements. In Symphony Space, for example, one may reasonably doubt 
that the parties ever had any actual contractual intentions on the question of 
whether the buy-back arrangement consisted of one single option or a number 
of separate ones. But such considerations are not always sufficient to dispose of 
                                                                                                                 
a consideration of how lawyers can manipulate the law to overcome legal norms); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR 
ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND 
PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)). 
 269. As Professor William Simon has rather delicatedly put it: ―[E]ven in a relatively 
reliable procedure, the lawyer typically has opportunities to improve her client‘s chances of 
success in ways that do no facilitate decision on the merits by the adjudicator.‖ WILLIAM H. 
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 143 (1998). For my own 
discussion at greater length of some more specific strategies, see generally Humbach, supra note 
7, at 1 (discussing abuse of confidentiality rules and the deliberate fabrication of controversy). 
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the question. The parties in Symphony Space may well not have had any real 
―intention‖ on the specific (and rather technical) single-option/multiple-options 
issue. But the lawyers for the not-for-profit could not have have been unaware 
that the investor never intended to give away completely a piece of property 
worth $20 million.  
According to the standards of today‘s exaggeratedly adversarial legal 
culture, one should praise the Symphony Space lawyers for advocating as they 
did. They had a client who had a big problem. They pursued what was, quite 
likely, the only really promising avenue for protecting their client‘s interests—
asserting a ―novel question‖ of law and an unexpected interpretation of the 
relevant agreement.
270
 The client retained them to find a way to save its use of 
the concert hall, and the lawyers considered it their job to find one, ―defer[ring] 
to the client regarding such questions as the . . . concern for third persons who 
might be adversely affected.‖271  
There remains, however, a legitimate question as to what ought to be the 
standards of the profession as a whole. When a client comes in and says, ―I‘ve 
made this contract and now I wish I hadn‘t,‖ or ―they say we‘re in breach and 
want to hold us liable,‖ what is the lawyer to do? Should not one of the first 
questions that the lawyer asks herself be: ―Is the contract valid? Can I find 
some legal way that it won‘t be enforced?‖ As noted earlier, the Model Rules 
are instinct with the idea that, in our adversary system, if there is a legal way to 
win, then winning must be right.
272
 And, it needs to be said, the lawyers for 
Symphony Space did win.
273
  
                                                                                                                 
 270. That is to say, faced with the law as it was, the lawyers for Symphony Space may have 
had no realistic choice but either to throw in the towel—give up the theater—or go for the 
whole thing via the Rule Against Perpetuities. If their choices were thusly limited, of course, it 
would be a reproach to the state of the law, but if the lawyers saw no way to produce a ―just‖ 
result, and had only a choice between two unjust ones, they can hardly be criticized for choosing 
the side of their own client. 
 271. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009). 
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28. 
 273. Perhaps the most astounding thing, at least for persons unaccustomed to the 
convoluted ideas that lawyers have about justice, is not that the lawyers argued that the ―buy-
back‖ was invalid, but that the Court of Appeals agreed. The court showed no regret or doubt 
about the forced expropriation and, on the contrary, offered a long explanation as to why it was 
legally right to take away the investor‘s property interest and give the whole building to 
Symphony Space. See Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 809 (N.Y. 
1996). By not taking notice of the separate-option interpretation, the court produced a line of 
reasoning which, every step of the way, seems eminently logical and firmly grounded in both 
law and policy, leading to a conclusion which, simply put, the law seems to require. Id. 
Unfortunately, that is no guarantee of soundness. Persuasive arguments can be produced by 
skillful rhetoricians on both sides of almost any seriously contended case. As Jonathan Swift 
once reminded us, tweaking our profession with irony, lawyers have ―the Art of Proving by 
Words multiplied for the Purpose, that White is Black, and Black is White.‖ JONATHAN SWIFT, 
GULLIVER‘S TRAVELS 227 (Christopher Fox ed., Bedford Books St. Martin‘s Press 1995) (1726). 
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Certainly, by one measure, victory is its own justification, and a legal 
victory left unrealized is like a ripe fruit left unpicked. However, the problem 
with treating victory as its own justification is that, if taken to its logical 
conclusion, nobody‘s property is safe as long as there is a sharp-eyed lawyer 
out there clever enough to figure out how to get it. For what skilled advocate 
cannot always think up some novel question of law or devise some unforeseen 
interpretation of an agreement? Is there any substantial chain of title that does 
not include at least one crucial deed or other link which, with a little imagina-
tion, cannot be robustly challenged—or, at least, cast in enough of a shadow to 
pry loose a substantial settlement? And what can be said of the vulnerability of 
property rights applies to all rights. This is not a question of a few charlatans 
but of highly principled advocates who, in loyal service to their clients‘ 
interests, pore through documents, records, testimony, and laws looking for 
ways to win.  
VII.  CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The legal process is unfortunately not perfect and, as a human institution, it 
never can be. It will always be possible that the process will make mistakes, 
producing outcomes that the substance of the law is not meant to produce. But 
the fact that mistakes can happen does not mean it is all right for lawyers to try 
to make them happen. It is not necessarily all right to get somebody else‘s 
property away from them, or to defeat their ―rights,‖ just because you can.  
The ultimate question is: What counts as legal justice? Is it that which the 
substance of the law prescribes, or is it whatever result the legal process can be 
led to produce? It may be inevitable that the law‘s burden will be different for 
some people than it is for others. It may be that there will always be one set of 
rules for ordinary folks, who are simply expected to obey, while something 
else—something less burdensome—applies for those able to hire lawyers to 
engineer their escapes. Even if this divergence may be in some degree 
inevitable, however, it does not follow that it ought to be condoned, much less 
left a wide area to flourish as it is under the Model Rules. Discrepancies 
between legal outcomes and substantive justice erode the basis for public 
confidence in the Rule of Law. Justice should not be divided—one thing for 
some, another for others—all contingent on the lawyer‘s acumen and skill. In a 
world of truly honest lawyers, it would not be.  
